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Since the Great Recession, local governments have been under pressure to cut 
programs, personnel, and services due to decreased tax revenues and a weak 
economic recovery. As a result, government agencies, aiming to do more with 
less, have consolidated services, including those of local 9-1-1 dispatch centers. 
This thesis explores whether 9-1-1 center consolidation has been 
successful thus far. Through a multiple case-study approach, the effects of 
consolidation upon cost efficiency, service levels, and organizational structure 
are examined. Primary data were gathered from semi-structured interviews with 
executives of three consolidated 9-1-1 centers. Secondary data were obtained 
from related budget documents, published reports, emergency call and response 
statistics, staffing rosters, organizational charts, and intergovernmental 
agreements. This mixture of qualitative and quantitative data was analyzed to 
identify individual first-order concepts, generalized into patterns, and synthesized 
into overarching dimensions. 
The key findings suggest that 
 the consolidation of 9-1-1 centers can result in increased cost 
efficiency through economies of scale; 
 regionally, 9-1-1 center consolidation may standardize and raise 
the quality of service provided across disciplines and jurisdictions; 
and  
 in the near-term, organizational behavior issues present challenges 
for the newly consolidated 9-1-1 center. 
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The nation’s link between citizens and public safety first-responders—police, fire, 
and emergency medical services—is the 9-1-1 emergency call system. Critical 
hubs of that network are the thousands of Public Safety Answering Points 
(PSAPs), or 9-1-1 centers, staffed by qualified emergency call-takers and public 
safety dispatchers. The personnel, facilities, and communications technology that 
combine to form an efficient and effective 9-1-1 center are what connect those in 
crisis with the necessary public safety response resources. Most local 9-1-1 
centers are owned and operated by individual public safety agencies; however, 
some are amalgamated centers serving multiple jurisdictions so that costs are 
shared among the participating agencies. 
Consolidation of 9-1-1 centers is not a new model for emergency 
communications, with some consolidated centers having been in operation for 
decades. However, the idea has gained increased interest as our nation’s 
economy has struggled through the Great Recession. State and local budgets 
have been slashed to account for decreased tax revenues, resulting in cuts to 
programs, personnel, and services. Public safety agencies have not been 
immune; some have experienced dramatic cuts to police and fire staffing. The 
reduced capabilities for local agencies weaken the homeland security enterprise 
as a whole. It is imperative then, that government identifies ways to maintain and 
even enhance core services despite fewer resources. Consolidation of resources 
is one possible means to that end; and, more specifically, the consolidation of 
local 9-1-1 centers may enable agencies to better meet service demands through 
improved efficiency. 
Purpose and Method of this Study 
Within this context raises the question, how successful has local 9-1-1 
Center consolidation been so far?  In search of the answer, three case studies of 
established consolidated 9-1-1 centers were conducted: Santa Cruz (CA) 
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Regional 9-1-1, Charleston County (SC) Consolidated 9-1-1, and Portland’s (OR) 
Bureau of Emergency Communications. Primary data were collected through 
semi-structured interviews of the top executives of these amalgamated 
organizations. Secondary information was gathered from agency publications, 
statistical reports, budget documents, staffing rosters, and direct observation. 
Interviews were audio-recorded, fully transcribed, and closely reviewed. 
Collected data were then analyzed through an iterative process. 
First, a chronological summation of facts within each of the categories was 
explored during individual interviews. These categories were general facts, 
budget and efficiency, service level, interoperability, governance, organizational 
behavior, politics, and other considerations. This revealed a number of “first-
order concepts” specific to each case study. The identified first-order concepts 
were then evaluated for underlying themes and patterns across case studies, 
resulting in 15 general “second-order themes.”  Finally, second-order themes 
were generalized and synthesized further into broad “overarching dimensions.”  
The overarching dimensions were used as a framework to present and discuss 
six key findings that emerged. 
Findings 
The six key findings presented herein provide insight for this study’s two 
areas of inquiry: 9-1-1 center consolidation’s effect on (1) cost efficiency and 
service quality, and (2) its organizational strengths and weaknesses. Taken 
together, these findings help answer the primary research question. A summary 
of the findings follows: 
 Interagency collaboration and resource sharing may be an 
important precursor to 9-1-1 center consolidation; and, the 
phenomena of 9-1-1 center consolidation itself may spawn 
additional collaboration and resource sharing. 
Two case studies revealed some amount of pre-consolidation 
collaboration and resource sharing within the region had occurred. This was in 
the form of a shared public safety radio system and/or other shared technology 
 xvii
systems. Furthermore, all three case studies demonstrated additional 
interagency cooperation and resource sharing occurred after consolidation, in the 
form of new data-sharing technology projects and common policy development 
that was ancillary to the core 9-1-1 dispatch function. All the consolidated 9-1-1 
centers improved communications interoperability to some degree within the 
region. 
 Consolidation requires a project champion and support from a 
coalition of top administrators and/or elected officials. 
Two case studies revealed that an individual or small core group of 
individuals was responsible for “driving” the initial concept of consolidation. In the 
case of Santa Cruz Regional 9-1-1 (SCR911), the “project champion” was both 
the top county administrator and the city manager of the largest municipality.1  
Together, they garnered support from two other city managers and formed a 
collation of four jurisdictional leaders. This core group drove the formation of the 
independent Joint Powers Authority that became SCR911.   
For Charleston County Consolidated 9-1-1 (CCC911), the initial concept 
was driven by a single police chief.2  He gained the full support of his mayor, who 
then persuaded other elected officials within the region to explore the idea as a 
group. Ultimately, the county became the lead agency, taking on the 
responsibility of the new consolidated center. CCC911 became a department 
within the county government structure.   
Portland’s Bureau of Emergency Communications (BOEC) has existed in 
some consolidated model for nearly 40 years, and data sets relative to the initial 
motivations and people involved were simply not available. 
 
 
                                            
1 Dennis Kidd (general manager of Santa Cruz Regional 9-1-1), personal interview with the 
author, August 22, 2013. 
2 James E. Lake and Allyson E. Burrell (director and deputy director of Charleston County 
Consolidated 911 Center), respectively, telephone conference call with the author, September 26, 
2013. 
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 Cost efficiency is realized through economies of scale. 
There was general agreement between all interview participants that the 
combining and sharing of 9-1-1 center resources through consolidation was more 
cost efficient than operating separate agency-specific centers within their 
respective regions. This qualitative assessment was supported by specific 
examples of cost reductions in the case of SCR911, and more broadly by 
technology improvements across all three centers.   
SCR911 recently consolidated two additional jurisdictions, so this case 
revealed accurate quantitative data as to the pre- and post-consolidation 9-1-1 
dispatch service costs for those two agencies. In two fiscal years, costs were 
reduced from approximately $1.4 million to approximately $500,000, a 64% 
drop.3  Additionally, in all three cases, costs for major technology improvements 
were shared across all participating agencies. Without consolidation, such 
expensive technology purchases would either be altogether unaffordable, or 
made by only the more financially viable 9-1-1 centers; the result likely being an 
inconsistent and uncoordinated mix of incompatible systems, producing varying 
levels of quality of service between agencies within the same region. The 
combined purchasing power of the group appears beneficial to the entire region 
when common facility, personnel, and technology needs exist. 
 Consolidation leads to more focused, institutionalized quality 
control and service improvement efforts. 
Data between case studies revealed a more focused and institutionalized 
level of quality control, and standards-based improvement efforts emerged after 
the consolidation of 9-1-1 centers. The concepts supporting this generalization 
included reduced response times, improved training programs, dedicated quality 
assurance programs, and accreditations. 
 
                                            
3 “County of San Benito California: Adopted Budget for Fiscal Year 2012–2013,” San Benito 
County Board of Supervisors, accessed October 26, 2013, http://cosb.us/wp-
content/uploads/FY2012-13-Adopted-Budget.pdf. 
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 Efforts result in improved resilience and surge capacity. 
Surge capacity is commonly used to reference the ability for hospitals to 
meet the sudden increased demands of a mass casualty event.4  However, the 
concept is applicable to any system subject to sudden, extreme increased 
demands for service. All three case studies yielded data supportive of the benefit 
of consolidation to surge capacity.   
First, capacity was increased by the centralization and increased number 
of on-duty emergency communications staff. Instead of smaller numbers of staff 
spread across multiple 9-1-1 centers, centralization provided a larger number of 
staff within one facility. This allows for a greater capacity to manage sudden and 
unexpected increases in demand, such as those created by larger events and 
catastrophes that occur within a single jurisdiction or cross multiple jurisdictions.   
Second, communications personnel in all three case studies possessed a 
broader level of training and developed skill set than those who had previously 
worked in a discipline specific center. This provides for a larger pool of personnel 
to handle any type of emergency call they may come into the 9-1-1 center. While 
the position becomes more demanding in terms of training and experience, each 
center studied here has proven that emergency communications personnel can 
be successfully cross trained to develop the required higher-level skill set.  
 Organizational behavior issues present challenges to the 
successful consolidation of 9-1-1 centers. 
A common theme of challenges associated with transitional issues for 
employees emerged from the research. Possible contributing factors included 
impacts to pay and benefits, change in working conditions and location, lack of 
an established organizational identity. These issues were less pronounced in the 
case of Portland’s BOEC, likely because of this organization’s long history as a 
consolidated, inter-disciplinary 9-1-1 center. However, all three case studies 
                                            
4 Samantha K. Watson, James W. Rudge, and Richard Coker, “Health Systems’ ‘Surge 
Capacity’: State of the Art and Priorities for Future Research,” Milbank Quarterly 91, no. 1 (2013): 
78–122. 
 xx
revealed that consolidation likely results in, at least in the near-term, additional 
challenges to employee training, hiring, retention, and morale. Two of the case 
studies revealed that the transitional employee attrition rate proved higher than 
anticipated during the early years of consolidation.   
Both the SCR911 and CCC911 initial consolidation efforts included 
offering all existing 9-1-1 center communications personnel employment with the 
new consolidated organization. Each experienced significant staffing challenges 
as the number of employees who successfully transitioned was much lower than 
had been anticipated. The most recent example was found in the CCC911 case 
study. As each existing 9-1-1 center was consolidated into that new organization, 
the employee attrition rate remained consistently high. The deputy director 
estimated only approximately 50% of existing 9-1-1 Center personnel completed 
the transition into the new agency.5 
Limitations and Additional Research 
Evaluating cost impacts across the case studies proved challenging, due 
to a general lack of available pre- and post-consolidation quantitative metrics and 
the numerous variables that exist between 9-1-1 center budgets. Further 
research is needed to accurately quantify these pre- and post-consolidation 
costs; which will require the availability of accurate historical and contemporary 
budget data, sufficient time, and specific analytical expertise relative to public 
agency budgeting. Additionally, research toward the development of 
standardized 9-1-1 center performance and cost-efficiency metrics could be 
beneficial. 
Conclusion 
From the findings, three major conclusions can be drawn: (1) the 
consolidation of 9-1-1 centers can result in increased cost efficiency through 
economies of scale; (2) regionally, 9-1-1 Center consolidation may standardize 
                                            
5 Lake and Burrell, conference call. 
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and raise the quality of service provided across disciplines and jurisdictions; and 
(3) in the near-term, organizational behavior issues present significant challenges 
for the newly consolidated 9-1-1 center. 
This study revealed that 9-1-1 center consolidation allows for the sharing 
of common public safety emergency communications resources between multiple 
agencies. These resources include facilities, communications infrastructure, and, 
most importantly for cost efficiency, personnel. This pooling and sharing of 
resources creates opportunities for cost savings and improved operational 
efficiency through its resulting economies of scale, especially when the 
consolidation combines small- to mid-size 9-1-1 centers. 
At the most basic level, the increased purchasing power a group of 
agencies has over that of a single agency provides a direct benefit of 
consolidation, allowing consolidated 9-1-1 centers to acquire advanced 
technologies that any of the member jurisdictions might not be able to afford 
alone. For operations, the increased number of personnel available in a larger 9-
1-1 Center has the dual effect of increasing surge capacity and allowing for the 
more efficient processing of regional workload. The primary factor for realizing 
these benefits is increased financial resources; infusing additional money into the 
system would seem to provide the same opportunity for economy of scale 
benefits to any 9-1-1 center, whether consolidated or not. However, given the 
limits of local public safety budgets for some jurisdictions, consolidation provides 
a means to attain economy of scale of benefits likely only available to the largest, 
well-funded independent 9-1-1 centers. 
This study also revealed that 9-1-1 center consolidation standardizes the 
service provided across member jurisdictions across all disciplines—law, fire, 
and EMS. This standardization generally raises the quality of service for some or 
all of the member agencies. Through its governance structure, the consolidated 
9-1-1 center is held accountable to all of its member agencies. In this way, the 
service provided becomes consistent and standardized throughout the region. 
Additionally, the increased size of the consolidated 9-1-1 center budget allows for 
 xxii
improvements to training programs, development of quality assurance programs, 
and the ability to attain accreditations from recognized professional 
organizations. Regional standardization alone, of course, does not equate to 
improved quality of service. However, when consolidated centers take advantage 
of the service quality improvement opportunities availed through increased 
common resources, the standardized level of service built into the model 
becomes a standardized level of higher quality service. 
Finally, this study revealed the most challenging aspects of 9-1-1 center 
consolidation involve organizational behavior issues associated with personnel 
transition. Although examples of positive individual employee transitions were 
revealed, established employees of separate 9-1-1 centers generally do not 
successfully transition into the new consolidated organization at the rates 
anticipated by project managers, with attrition rates as high as 50% for the most 
recent transition examined in this study. Possible reasons for this difficulty in 
transition include negative impacts to pay and benefits, loss of identity with the 
previous organization, higher skill set requirements of the new interdisciplinary 
position, and changes to working conditions and location. These challenges 
seem to be more pronounced during the early years of consolidation and may 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Chinese use two brush strokes to write the word “crisis.” One 
brush stroke stands for danger; the other for opportunity. In a crisis, 
be aware of the danger—but recognize the opportunity. 
—John F. Kennedy, 
speech in Indianapolis, April 12, 1959 
 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT—BACKGROUND 
The 9-1-1 emergency communications system as we know it today was 
developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s.1  Since then, the system has 
become the primary link between the public and our nation’s local public safety 
practitioners—police, fire, and emergency medical services—in times of crisis. 
The intermediary component of this emergency communications system is the 
public safety telecommunications professional. These women and men staff the 
designated Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs), or 9-1-1 centers, 
throughout the country; answering an estimated240 million emergency calls for 
help annually and, in turn, dispatching field personnel and coordinating their 
responses over the radio.2  The job of these professionals is to ensure that 
emergency calls are answered quickly and properly, 24 hours per day, 365 days 
per year, and that the appropriate emergency resources are guided to where 
they are needed as rapidly and efficiently as possible. 
There are more than 7,500 PSAPs in the United States.3  The vast 
majority of PSAPs are relatively small and associated with a single municipal or 
county public safety agency. For example, in California 56% of the state’s 9-1-1 
                                            
1 Gary Allen, “The History of 911,” Dispatch Magazine On-Line, accessed January 20, 2013, 
http://www.911dispatch.com/911/history/index.html. 
2 “Public Safety Communications—Facts & Figures,” Dispatch Magazine On-Line, accessed 
October 15, 2013, http://www.911dispatch.com/public-safety-communications-facts-figures/. 
3 “PSAP Registry,” Federal Communications Commission, accessed January 20, 2013, 
http://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/services/911-services/enhanced911/psapregistry.html. 
2 
centers have only three workstations or less.4  However, some are consolidated 
9-1-1 centers servicing multiple agencies. This model of consolidated PSAP  
has been considered by counties and municipalities across the nation as a 
means for cost cutting, cost sharing, efficiency, and improved service. 
Consolidation of 9-1-1 emergency dispatch service may also result in improved 
communications interoperability, which was noted as an important problem by 
the 9/11 Commission5 and New York City’s McKinsey Report.6 
Although the amalgamation of public safety dispatch centers is not a new 
concept, with some amalgamated centers having operated for more than  
40 years,7 the interest in consolidation appears to have increased over the past 
five years; possibly due to reductions in revenue broadly experienced by state 
and local governments across the United States.8  The resulting cuts to local 
safety budgets have forced unprecedented reductions in staffing and resources, 
leading to significantly reduced service levels. Some localities, such as Camden, 
NJ, and Stockton, CA, have seen revenue declines that threaten their ability to 
provide core, essential services. This has forced local governments to consider 
consolidation as a possible cost cutting measure.  
Budget cuts in Camden, which is considered one of the most crime-
plagued cities in the country, forced police layoffs.9  Subsequent budget shortfalls 
                                            
4 “California 9-1-1 Strategic Plan,” California Office of the Chief Information Officer, accessed 
January 20, 2013, http://www.cta.ca.gov/PSCO/911/pdf/911_Strategic_Plan.pdf. 
5  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 9/11 Commission 
Report, (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011). Authorized audio edition, abridged.  
6 “Improving NYPD Emergency Preparedness and Response,” McKinsey & Company, 
accessed February 8, 2014, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=1175. 
7 Walter Currier and James Dye, “Consolidated Dispatch: Embraced or Feared?,” 9-1-1 
Magazine, June 1, 2011, http://www.9-1-1magazine.com/AECOM-Consolidated-Dispatch-
Centers. 
8 “Recession-Battered Cities Combine Services,” USA Today, October 19, 2012, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/10/18/recession-hit-cities-combines-
services/1634301/. 
9 Elizabeth Fiedler, “Crime-Riddled N.J. City Considers Axing Police Force,” WBUR, 
accessed October 15, 2013, http://www.wbur.org/npr/159171796/riddled-with-crime-n-j-city-turns-
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drove that city to consider even more dramatic steps, such as replacing the city’s 
police force with one operated by the county.10  In Stockton, years of budget 
shortfalls forced the elimination of a quarter of its sworn police force (99 police 
officer positions)11 and 48 firefighter positions in 2011.12  Despite the draconian 
cuts, Stockton’s general fund ultimately become insolvent, requiring the city to 
seek Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection—becoming, at the time, the largest 
municipality to ever do so.13 
For Stockton, a city with a population of just fewer than 300,000, the public 
safety cuts negatively correlated with an immediate increase in violent crime. 
Stockton’s violent crime (homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) rose 
by more than 14% from 2010 through 2012.14  Most concerning, the city 
experienced consecutive record-breaking years for numbers of criminal 
homicide, with 58 in 2011 and 71 in 2012. Table 1 presents Stockton’s overall 
crime indices and violent crime statistics for the 15-year period ending in 2012. 
  
                                            
10 Ibid. 
11 Jim Christie, “Stockton, California to File for Bankruptcy,” Reuters, June 27, 2012, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/27/us-economy-stockton-idUSBRE85Q07X20120627. 
12 “City of Stockton Lays off 36 Firefighters,” Stockton: Central/East/South News, June 30 
2011, http://stockton-central.news10.net/news/news/75195-city-stockton-lays-36-firefighters. 
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14 Stockton Police Department Crime Information Center, Crime in Stockton over 15 Years, 
(Stockton, CA: Stockton Police Department, February 2013). 
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Table 1.   Stockton Crime Statistics—Uniform Crime Reporting 
(UCR) and California Crime Index (CCI)15 
 
Arguably, police and fire service level reductions are jeopardizing public 
safety and thereby, threatening homeland security. The homeland security 
enterprise as a whole then must necessarily identify effective means to maintain 
or enhance current safety service levels despite shrinking revenues. The 
consolidation of governmental resources in general may be a key component 
toward accomplishing the homeland security enterprise’s mission, and, 
specifically, the consolidation of PSAPs may improve homeland security through 
improved cost efficiency and communications interoperability. 
On the surface, it would appear much duplication of effort exists among 
local public safety agencies with regard to emergency communications. Many 
agencies own and maintain a separate PSAP, each requiring physical space and 
a vast support infrastructure composed of valuable administrative, technological, 
and personnel resources. Perhaps this perceived inefficiency is justified by less 
obvious benefits, such as the need or desire for complete control at the agency 
level to meet the specific service expectations of the community it serves. Or, 
perhaps this is just as it appears on the surface, an inefficient use of diminishing 
resources; a service requirement that might be better served through the 
consolidation and sharing of these resources. Thus, PSAP consolidation might 
be considered a “smart practice” for the homeland security enterprise. 
                                            
15 Ibid. 
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Researching existing consolidated PSAP to determine the effects on 
safety service levels, costs, interoperability, and related issues will contribute to 
the base of knowledge upon which homeland security leaders can make 
informed decisions. Such research may also provide insight as to how to 
accomplish an effective consolidation once that decision has been made. The 
experiences of others who have successfully navigated the issues surrounding a 
major 9-1-1 center consolidation should provide valuable lessons and a more 
holistic understanding of the scope of such a project. Areas to consider with 
regard to these “lessons” might include the organizational behavior (cultural), 
technological, environmental, economic, and political challenges of bringing 
together 9-1-1 communications centers that have traditionally remained separate. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Within the context described above emerges the question, how successful 
has local emergency 9-1-1 communications center consolidation been so far?  
Specifically: 
 Have existing consolidated 9-1-1 communications centers realized 
improved cost efficiency while also maintaining or improving service 
levels? 
 Have common organizational strengths and weaknesses emerged 
that provide insight for agencies considering or implementing a 9-1-
1 Center consolidation? 
These questions provide the foundation for the research that follows. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The 9/11 Commission Report provides a thorough review of the events 
surrounding the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The report notes that the 
inability to communicate was a critical element at all three attack sites, strongly 
indicating that “compatible and adequate communications among public safety 
organizations at the local, state, and federal levels remains an important 
problem.”16  The New York Police Department’s McKinsey Report provides an in-
                                            
16 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 9/11 Commission Report, authorized audio 
edition. 
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depth examination of that agency’s overall response to the 9/11 attacks, 
identifying 20 improvement opportunities. Several of these opportunities  
involved communications, either through enhancement of command and control 
structure or communications technologies.17  Neither report, however, examines 
how an integrated, cross-jurisdictional and/or cross-discipline emergency 
communications center might provide full or partial solutions to these problems. 
The existing literature relative to PSAP consolidation is limited. That which 
does exist can be divided into several main categories: studies commissioned by 
an agency, or group of agencies, to explore the feasibility of consolidating 
services (by far the largest amount of available research); trade magazine and 
newspaper articles; and other literature, to include papers issued by government 
sector professional associations and academic theses. 
1. Studies Commissioned by Agencies 
A number of “feasibility studies” have been completed to examine and make 
recommendations as to PSAP consolidation. These studies were requested and 
funded by groups of geographically proximate agencies that had some political or 
financial interest in consolidation. As an example, a state-funded study in New 
Jersey explored consolidation of services for cost savings and improved 
interoperability for Atlantic County.18  The impetus for that study was “a result of 
federal initiatives and state legislation geared toward interoperability and reducing 
costs via increased shared services.”  The study was funded through New Jersey’s 
Enhanced 9-1-1 county grant program, which is intended to encourage localities to 
consolidate emergency communications resources.19 
                                            
17 “Improving NYPD Emergency,” McKinsey. 
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Conclusions Report (Edinburg, PA: Kimball & Associates, June 2007), 
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Other feasibility studies examined for this review, listed below, generally 
made similar findings in support of consolidation. These studies are associated 
with the following jurisdictions/regions: 
 Barnstable County, Massachusetts20  
 City of Parma, Ohio21  
 Cities of Ashland and Wooster, and Wayne County, Ohio22 
 Towns of Bridgewater, East Bridgewater, Duxbury, Halifax, 
Kingston, Plympton, Whitman, and Plymouth, Massachusetts23 
 14 communities in Cuyahoga County, Ohio24 
 Towns of Ashland, Framingham, Holliston, Hopkinton, Natick, 
Sherborn, Sudbury, and Wayland—the “MetroWest” area of 
Middlesex County, Massachusetts25 
The general theme in favor of merging public safety communications 
centers that emerged from the various studies was based upon several identified 
benefits: 
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Case Studies (Cleveland State University, Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, 
August 29, 2011), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=701255. 
23 AECOM, “Old Colony Planning Council Regional Emergency Communications Center 
Dispatch Feasibility Study,” (Lynchburg, VA: AECOM, April 2013), 
http://www.ocpcrpa.org/docs/comprehensive/Old_Colony_Regional_911_Dispatch_Final_Report.
pdf. 
24 AECOM Design, CTA Communications, New River Regional 9-1-1 Emergency 
Communications Consolidation Feasibility Study (Lynchburg, VA: AECOM, July 17, 2009), 
http://www.roanoke.com/pdfs/911study_nra.pdf. 
25 Webb Consulting Services, Regional Emergency Communications Center Feasibility 
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 Significant, but long-term, cost savings resulting from reduced 
office space, reduced/shared personnel resources, economies of 
scale (increased production with fewer inputs) 
 Enhanced service levels (mostly for smaller agencies) 
 Improved voice and data communications interoperability 
 Improved and more efficient use of technology, through shared IT 
infrastructure, increased purchasing power, and standardization 
across jurisdictions 
The studies also presented some challenges/concerns, which include: 
 Loss of autonomy and local control 
 Decreased ability to meet specific, localized goals/needs of 
individual communities and agencies 
 Personnel concerns relative to combining staff from differing 
agencies with disparate pay/benefit packages and administrative 
personnel regulations 
In general, the findings concluded these challenges were manageable and 
could be overcome with a well-organized, inclusive governance structure such as 
a Joint Powers Authority (JPA) or Council of Governments (COG), coupled with a 
very strong “champion” of the effort at the executive/political level. The JPA and 
COG governance structures address loss of local control concerns by providing 
equal representative voices for each participating agency. The project champion 
at the executive/political level provides the motivation for administrators to 
overcome the resistance to change that is almost certain to occur with any 
consolidation effort. 
With regard to the need for a “project champion,” a special leadership 
style may be required. Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson present the idea that a new 
form of leadership is necessary to accelerate the organizational change that must 
occur for enhanced preparedness post-9/11: 
Leadership could work—and it has—to fortify the silo mentality of 
agencies, this despite the fact that it is the coordinated action of 
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many agencies working together that is essential to advancing the 
national preparedness effort.26   
The executive/political leader mentioned in the literature here is 
representative of the meta-leadership necessary to successfully consolidate 
multiple agencies’ emergency communications centers, as the full integration of 
9-1-1 dispatch services involves the collaboration of multiple jurisdictions, 
agencies, and disciplines. For example, a fully consolidated regional PSAP would 
require cooperation between the elected officials of several local governments, 
cooperation within and across the public safety agencies of those local 
jurisdictions, and cooperation within and across all three disciplines—law 
enforcement, fire services, and emergency medical services (EMS). 
2. Trade Magazine and Newspaper Articles 
Generally, trade magazine and newspaper articles present a fairly neutral 
position on consolidation of emergency dispatch centers. Such articles are often 
simply a reporting of a recently released feasibility study, as discussed above, or 
of a governmental decision to move forward with consolidation. They sometimes 
discuss and present the pros and cons of consolidation, which are in line with the 
benefits and challenges listed above. They do, however, provide more of a 
personal view regarding the issue from those involved in the process, such as 
agency directors, police chiefs, and fire chiefs. This sometimes reveals polar 
opposite views regarding consolidation, unique to the circumstances of individual 
agencies. 
Several articles in the trade magazine Government Technology—Digital 
Communities, for example, report on specific PSAP or general IT consolidation 
efforts with a focus upon the actual brand of technology being implemented. The 
articles sometimes present a very limited description of the problems 
                                            
26 Leonard J. Marcus, Barry C. Dorn, and Joseph M. Henderson, Meta-Leadership and 
National Emergency Preparedness: Strategies to Build Government Connectivity (Working 
Papers, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Center for Public Leadership, Harvard 
University, Cambridge.) Accessed January 27, 2013., https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=5180. 
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encountered during, and benefits resulting from, the consolidation. For example, 
an article titled “Ann Arbor and Washtenaw County, Mich., Co-Locate 911 Staffs 
in One Dispatch Center,” includes a statement from an involved police sergeant 
indicating the “co-location of dispatch services” will provide cost savings and 
enhanced emergency services.27  The same article makes a slight reference to 
problems involving the integration of the police mobile data computer system. 
Another article, “Akron, Ohio, and Summit County Collaborate on Cellular 911 
Service,” reports that a City-County partnership led to the shared purchase of a 
new 9-1-1 emergency phone system that saved approximately $150,000, when 
compared to the cost of purchasing separate systems.28  In general, claims of 
cost savings revolve around the sharing of costs for common facilities, 
equipment, and technology between multiple agencies. Articles such as these 
provide virtually no in-depth cost analysis or detailed discussion of the challenges 
and benefits associated with PSAP consolidation 
One 9-1-1 Magazine article by Marc Bono provides many items to 
consider relative to the value of PSAP consolidation.29  The article lists specific 
considerations that go beyond basic cost savings for those contemplating 
consolidation, encouraging a more holistic evaluation process that incorporates 
overall quality of service and the identification of hidden expenses. For example, 
the author discusses the possible hidden costs associated with dispatchers’ 
ancillary duties—duties other than standard handling of 9-1-1 calls. When a 
consolidation occurs, these ancillary duties do not disappear and must be 
accounted for in pre-consolidation cost/benefit analyses.  
                                            
27 “Ann Arbor and Washtenaw County, Mich., Co-Locate 911 Staffs in One Dispatch Center,” 
Government Technology—Digital Communities, accessed February 9, 2013, 
http://www.digitalcommunities.com/articles/Ann-Arbor-and-Washtenaw-County-Mich.html. 
28 “Akron, Ohio, and Summit County Collaborate on Cellular 911 Service,” Government 
Technology—Digital Communities, accessed January 21, 2013, 
http://www.digitalcommunities.com/articles/Akron-Ohio-and-Summit-County-Collaborate.html. 
29 Marc W. Bono, “Identifying Value in PSAP Consolidations,” 9-1-1 Magazine, accessed 
February 9, 2013, http://www.9-1-1magazine.com/Identifying-Value-in-PSAP-Consolidations/. 
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Newspaper articles reporting on consolidation efforts sometimes include 
the viewpoints of the involved leaders, which at times are conflicting. Some 
express concern regarding the loss of local control and question the potential 
cost savings often touted in feasibility studies. For example, in an article by 
reporter Michael Bailey of Cape Cod’s The Enterprise, one of several police 
chiefs involved in a potential consolidation effort stated, “We feel we would lose a 
lot of local control if it was a state operation.”30  Still others embrace the concept 
because of clear staffing and efficiency benefits for their own agencies. A police 
chief involved in the same potential consolidation effort stated, “The initiative is 
coming at a perfect time for us. We’d like to ‘civilianize’ dispatch. Our police 
officers work the desk two to four times a month and their ability to maintain a 
solid knowledge of dispatch functions is challenging because, the rest of the 
time, they’re out on the streets.”31  While articles such as these present 
generalized statements about potential benefits and challenges, they do not 
provide more in-depth analysis to determine the legitimacy of such claims. 
3. Other Literature—Theses 
Although there appears to be no theses specifically focused on the 
consolidation of emergency 9-1-1 communications centers, several have been 
written regarding the broader topic of combining public safety agencies and 
services. 
One such thesis by Vinicio R. Mata, “The Contribution of Police and Fire 
Consolidation to the Homeland Security Mission,” explores the value of 
combining municipal police and fire departments into a single public safety 
agency, with personnel trained and equipped for both roles.32  Through a 
                                            
30 Michael C. Bailey, “Public Safety Departments On Board with Regional Dispatch Model,” 
The Enterprise, September 28, 2012, http://www.capenews.net/communities/region/news/2121. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Vinicio R. Mata, “The Contribution of Police and Fire Consolidation to the Homeland 
Security Mission” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=27185. 
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comparative case study of three existing consolidated public safety agencies, the 
thesis suggests that consolidation serves to improve communication between 
disciplines, provides a more unified command and leadership structure, and 
produces a higher level of emergency preparedness through its comprehensive 
approach to public safety emergencies. Although this thesis does not address 9-
1-1 dispatch centers, the same purported benefits might also apply to a 
consolidation involving only the emergency communications centers of these two 
disciplines. A question not explored by Mata is whether police and fire agency 
consolidation increases or decreases costs. 
Another thesis, titled “Can Local Police and Sheriff’s Departments Provide 
a Higher Degree of Homeland Security Coordination and Collaboration through 
Consolidation of Police Services?” examines the strengths and weaknesses of a 
complete consolidation of law enforcement agencies within a specific county or 
region (sheriff’s departments and police departments).33  The author notes two 
common “non-starters” for consolidation efforts, which fit within a common theme 
found throughout the literature: loss of local control and reduction of 
responsiveness to community needs.34  However, he describes a specific 
example where these two concerns were found to be false by agencies that had 
developed an integrated public safety response. This example also demonstrates 
that the two relatively small agencies were able to increase service levels while 
at the same time reduce administrative personnel costs.35  Notably, the first key 
step recognized by these two agencies, should they move forward with 
consolidation, was the establishment of a Joint Powers Authority. This need for 
an effective governance structure as a key component of any consolidation is 
common throughout the literature, and should be examined in more depth as it 
applies to PSAP consolidation specifically. 
                                            
33 Michael P. Callagy, “Can Local Police and Sheriff’s Departments Provide a Higher Degree 
of Homeland Security Coordination and Collaboration through Consolidation of Police Services?” 
(Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=16058.  
34 Ibid., 32. 
35 Ibid., 33. 
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In his thesis, Michael P. Callagy also notes a potential cost-savings benefit 
for the consolidation of these agencies through the sharing of costs required to 
update antiquated systems, specifically referencing each agency’s independent 
dispatch center. One of his recommendations is to establish a regional dispatch 
center for San Mateo County, California.36  He claims that “the redundancy of 
dispatch centers plays a major part in the ‘disconnect’ of intelligence information 
in the county” and suggests that dispatch centers throughout California should be 
combined into regional centers.37  Callagy also claims that “tremendous” financial 
savings could result, but provides no figures as to how much savings might 
actually be realized. He also claims that the consolidation of dispatch centers 
could result in an “increase in communication throughout the county as 
information on crimes that were just committed in one jurisdiction could be readily 
broadcast throughout the county resulting in better coordination.”38  This theme 
of improved intelligence sharing and coordination, coupled with potential costs 
savings, is also common to the literature and deserves additional examination. 
There appears to be a significant gap in literature examining established 
consolidated PSAPs to evaluate the actualized strengths and challenges of 
consolidation. As one New Jersey study specifically noted: 
The results of consolidation are not well documented. Examples of 
cost savings are more commonly cited at the state level than at the 
local level. Estimates of cost savings related to personnel are 
particularly elusive. State and regional officials strongly believe that 
consolidation leads to improved service, although it is not clear how 
improved service is measured.39 
Existing literature has been focused on examining the feasibility of 
consolidating multiple PSAPs within a similar region or county, and has often 
been driven by State-mandated, or at least State-encouraged, efforts toward 
                                            
36 Ibid., 114. 
37 Ibid., 114–115. 
38 Ibid., 115. 
39 Fraser, New Jersey 9-1-1 Consolidation Study, 2. 
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consolidation. Additional research regarding the actual strengths and challenges 
realized post-consolidation may be useful to the homeland security enterprise. 
The literature identifies several key claims to justify consolidation: (1) 
financial savings through efficiencies and shared resources (economies of scale), 
(2) improved public safety service levels, and (3) improved communications 
interoperability. Examining the extent to which these purported benefits truly 
occur post-consolidation will allow for more informed decisions by those working 
hard to maintain and enhance public safety during times of challenged financial 
resources. This examination and resulting knowledge will also better inform those 
in public safety regarding their decisions relative to improved radio and data 
communications interoperability. 
D. METHOD OF INQUIRY 
This research was conducted in an attempt to answer the primary 
question, “How successful has emergency 9-1-1 communications center 
consolidation been so far for local public safety agencies?”  The research utilized 
a qualitative multiple case-study method of inquiry, including in-depth interviews, 
as outlined by Yin.40  Such a qualitative approach, as described by Yvonne N. 
Bui, “starts with specific situations, finds patters or themes in the data, 
establishes a tentative hypothesis, and then develops theories or conclusions.”41  
This method was employed due to a general lack of previous academic research 
specific to this subject matter and the need to examine causality; namely, the 
causal nexus between emergency 9-1-1 communications center consolidation 
and its impacts upon “local” public safety at the regional (county) and municipal 
levels. 
Case-study research is an accepted methodology for the description, 
interpretation, verification, and evaluation of policies, practices, systems, and 
                                            
40 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Los Angeles, CA: SAGE, 
2009), 107. 
41 Yvonne N. Bui, How to Write a Master’s Thesis (Los Angeles, CA: SAGE, 2009), 14. 
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generalizations within a real-world context.42  Further, case-study research is a 
common and appropriate method in the social science disciplines, including 
public administration; and has a distinct advantage over other methods when “[a] 
‘how’ or ‘why’ question is being asked about a contemporary set of events, over 
which the investigator has little or no control.”43  The case-study method 
employed here sought to reveal the strengths and challenges of consolidation 
through a detailed examination of three existing, well-established consolidated 
emergency 9-1-1 communications centers (9-1-1 centers). The multiple case-
study design was preferred here, over a single case-study approach, as analysis 
consistently applied across several cases should provide a stronger basis for 
generalized conclusions and recommendations.44 
1. METHOD 
A multiple case study of three consolidated centers was conducted:  
(1) Santa Cruz (CA) Regional 9-1-1 (SCR911); (2) City of Portland (OR) Bureau 
of Emergency Communications (BOEC), and (3) Charleston County (SC) 
Consolidated 9-1-1 Center (CCC911).  
These centers were selected for study as they are established regional 
centers, serving more than one discipline across multiple jurisdictions. Each also 
has a different governance structure, which is a key focus of this research. 
SCR911 operates independently as a Joint Powers Authority (JPA). Portland’s 
BOEC operates a Center that contracts with multiple outside jurisdictions to 
provide 9-1-1 dispatch services. CCC911 is operated by Charleston County 
through an intergovernmental agreement with its member agencies. The centers 
also differ in size—in terms of employees, member agencies, and populations 
served. This provided the opportunity to explore possible variations with regard to 
                                            
42 Paul D. Leedy and Jeanne Ellis Ormrod, Practical Research: Planning and Design, 10th 
ed. (Boston: Pearson, 2013), 140. 
43 Yin, Case Study Research, 5, 13. 
44 Ibid., 19–20. 
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governance structure and their ability to adequately meet specific 
community/agency needs. 
Data were collected in the form of documents, such as annual budget 
reports, strategic plans, news articles, staffing rosters, scheduling guidelines, 
customer service surveys, audit reports, and statistical reports related to staffing, 
call load and call processing. This data was used to guide semi-structured 
interviews with each Center’s executive manager at the Director or Deputy 
Director level. Interviews were conducted on-site in the case of SCR911 and 
Portland’s BOEC, and over the telephone for CCC911. These in-depth interviews 
with executives provided context to the analysis and garnered insight from 
leaders in the emergency communications field, which provided meaning to the 
data collected and extracted “lessons learned” from their individual and collective 
experiences with 9-1-1 center consolidations. Interviews such as these have 
been shown to be an important data gathering method when seeking to 
understand how a process or state of affairs, such as center consolidation, came 
to be.45  To mitigate risk of bias, information gathered from the interviews was 
corroborated to the extent possible by the aforementioned and other sources. 
Direct observation in the form of on-site visits was included as another 
source of data gathering. The on-site interview of the SCR911’s manager and 
Portland’s BOEC manager provided an opportunity to observe center operations 
first-hand. Observations of on-coming/outgoing personnel at shift changes, team 
meetings or “roll calls,” working conditions (building, equipment, furniture, etc.) 
and actual interactions of telecommunicators (emergency call-takers and 
dispatchers) with citizens and field personnel, provided additional data to support 
findings and conclusions. 
                                            
45 Ibid., 106, 108. 
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E. SEMI-STRUCTURED DATA COLLECTION FRAMEWORK AND 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Data collection was focused yet remained flexible, allowing for themes that 
developed during the collection process to drive further inquiry into specific 
areas. The following framework and associated pre-scripted interview questions 
for data collection was consistently employed across all three case studies. 
1. General Facts Regarding the Center (Location, Size, Structure, 
Disciplines Served, Population Served, Etc.) 
 When was your 9-1-1 Center first established 
(consolidated)? 
 How many personnel are employed by the center and what 
are their job classifications?  Has staffing historically 
increased, decreased, or remained stable? 
 What is your shift structure (personnel deployment 
schedule)? 
 Which public safety agencies and disciplines does the center 
serve? 
2. Budget / Efficiency 
 Does consolidation save money and improve efficiency? 
How? 
 Have you compared post-consolidation operational costs to 
pre-consolidation costs?  What were the results?  Has 
consolidation reduced costs for the member/participating 
agencies? 
 What is the estimated cost per telephone transaction (9-1-1 
call)? 
3. Service Levels 
 Does consolidation improve the level of service provided to 
customers, both internal and external (faster response times, 
quality of communications with field units, more regional 
coordination of available resources, etc.)?  Have you 
evaluated customer satisfaction through surveys or some 
other feedback mechanism? 
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 How are unique, agency-specific service issues managed?  
For example, do certain agencies have specific community 
or operational expectations regarding service that your 
Center addresses differently than others?  This speaks to 
the level of “local control” each agency maintains with regard 
to 9-1-1 call processing and dispatching of field resources. 
4. Interoperability 
 Does consolidation benefit or hinder regional voice and data 
radio interoperability? 
 Since your center was established, has communications 
equipment or other technology become more standardized 
across member agencies to improve interoperability across 
jurisdictions and/or disciplines? 
 Does your center also provide some level of information 
technology services to member/participating agencies? 
5. Governance 
 What is your center’s governance structure? 
 During the initial consolidation process, what other forms of 
governance were considered, if any?  How was the 
governance structure for your center ultimately decided 
upon? 
6. Organizational Behavior   
 Was there significant support or resistance from various 
bargaining groups (unions) during the initial consolidation?   
 Were employees involved in the consolidation planning and 
implementation process, if so, to what extent? 
 What unanticipated benefits or challenges emerged with 
regard to personnel matters during the consolidation 
process? 
7. Politics 
 During the initial consolidation process, was there a clear 
“champion” of the concept/effort?  Was this person an 
elected official? 
 Which agency/jurisdiction would you consider to have been 
the lead agency during the initial consolidation effort? 
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 What were the primary motivations/drivers behind the 
consolidation effort?  Was there some sort of crisis situation 
or specific set of circumstances that increased pressure to 
consolidate 9-1-1 center resources? 
 Does consolidation meet with significant political resistance? 
8. Other Considerations 
 What other models of consolidation are you aware of and 
how do they differ from yours?   
 Are consolidation plans generally developed from the top 
down or bottom up?  To what extent are line level and 
supervisory staff involved in the consolidation process? 
 Ultimately, who are the decision makers for your 9-1-1 
center policy and operations? 
 What is the most significant benefit of 9-1-1 center 
consolidation?  What is the most significant challenge? 
F. ANALYSIS PROCESS 
Data was analyzed according to the following steps.46 
 Case details—A chronological summation of facts related to each 
center 
 Categorization—Data were clustered into 8 categories: general 
facts, budget/efficiency, service, interoperability, governance, 
organizational behavior, politics, and other considerations 
 Interpretation of single instances—Data were examined for specific 
meaning in relation to the strengths or weaknesses of 
consolidation, referred to herein as “first order concepts” 
 Identification of patterns—The interpreted data were examined in 
more detail for underlying themes and patterns, referred to herein 
as “second order themes” 
 Synthesis and generalizations—An overall portrait of the combined 
data case was constructed, referred to herein as “overarching 
dimensions” 
 From this analytical process, key findings emerged, leading to the 
major conclusions 
  
                                            
46 Leedy and Ormrod, Practical Research, 141–142. 
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II. CASE STUDY—SANTA CRUZ REGIONAL 911 
Geographically, we were just 17 miles from the Silicon Valley; 
technologically, we were 1,000 years behind the Silicon Valley. 
—Dennis Kidd, SCR911 general manager, 
speaking to the technological upgrades 
made possible through consolidation 
 
A. BACKGROUND 
Santa Cruz Regional 911 (SCR911) is an independent public agency 
operating as a Joint Powers Authority (JPA) that provides 9-1-1 emergency 
communications and dispatch services for its member public safety agencies. 
This JPA was established in 1994 by four local government entities: county of 
Santa Cruz, city of Santa Cruz, city of Capitola, and city of Watsonville. These 
four founding members now own and primarily control the SCR911 JPA. Upon its 
creation, SCR911 consolidated four separate 9-1-1 emergency communications 
centers (9-1-1 centers) previously operated by each of the founding jurisdictions. 
Initially, SCR911 provided 9-1-1 dispatch services for all law enforcement, 
fire service, and emergency medical services (EMS) agencies within Santa Cruz 
County, except for those of the City of Scotts Valley. In 2011, SCR911 added the 
neighboring county of San Benito and city of Hollister. SCR911 also services 
several local fire districts, American Medical Response West (the area EMS 
paramedic and ambulance transport provider), and the Santa Cruz County 
Animal Shelter. Table 2 presents the SCR911 member and user agencies. 
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Table 2.   SCR911 Partner Agencies 









Response – West 




Scotts Valley Fire 
Department  
Santa Cruz Police Ben Loman Fire Central Fire 
Watsonville Police Felton Fire Boulder Creek Fire
Capitola Police Branciforte Fire Aptos Fire Other Agencies Served 
Hollister Police UCSC Fire Department Zayante Fire 
Santa Cruz County 
Animal Shelter 
 
SCR911 comprises 55 employees, including 42 public safety 
telecommunicators (dispatchers) and several information technology (IT) staff 
members. Administratively, the center is led and supervised by a general 
manager, two dispatch supervisors, two program managers, and two program 
supervisors. This staffing level has remained fairly consistent since the initial 
formation of the JPA, but has increased slightly with the addition of IT personnel 
and dispatch positions as additional agencies signed on for SCR911 services. 




Figure 1.  Santa Cruz Regional 9-1-1 2012 Organizational Chart52 
                                            
52 Santa Cruz Regional 9-1-1, Santa Cruz Regional 9-1-1: 2012 Annual Report, (Santa Cruz, CA: Santa Cruz Regional 9-1-1, 2013), 
3, http://www.scr911.org/downloads/files/2012report.pdf. 
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Dispatchers provide 24-hour coverage that is based upon workload, with 
some shifts staffed more heavily than others. The dispatch staffing structure 
includes both 10-hour and 12-hour work periods or “shifts,” divided into two 
teams of personnel: the Red Team and Blue Team. The Red Team works 
Sunday through Wednesday and the Blue Team works Wednesday through 
Saturday. Wednesday is an “overlap” day when both teams are scheduled to 
work. The added staffing on this day allows for regular training and other 
administrative work. This shift structure closely matches that of all law agencies 
SCR911 serves, which provides some level of consistency across jurisdictional 
boundaries. Table 3 presents the basic minimum staffing targets for SCR911’s 
personnel deployment (dispatchers only). In addition, SCR911 maintains at least 
one call-taker on duty.  
Table 3.   SCR911 Dispatcher Staffing Deployment Targets53 
Hours 0600 0800 0900 1000 1100 1400 1900 2300 2400 0100 0200 0300
Dispatchers 5 6 7 9 10 11 10 9 8 7 6 5
Hours 0600 0800 0900 1000 1400 1900 2100 2400 0100 0200 0300
Dispatchers 5 6 8 10 11 10 9 8 7 6 5
Hours 0600 0800 0900 1000 2000 2100 2400 0200 0300
Dispatchers 5 6 8 10 9 8 7 6 5
Hours 0600 0800 0900 1000 1100 2000 2300 2400 0200 0300
Dispatchers 5 6 7 9 10 9 8 7 6 5
SCR911 - Dispatcher Minimum Staffing Guidelines
Summer Weekends: Friday - Saturday (Memorial Day Weekend until Mid Sept)
Summer Weekends: Sunday (Memorial Day Weekend unitl Mid Sept)
All Year (Except Summer as Above) Sunday - Wednesday
All Year (Except Summer as Above) Thursday - Saturday
 
 
B. BUDGET / EFFICIENCY 
A primary question asked of SCR911 General Manager Dennis Kidd was 
whether the consolidation of separate 9-1-1 centers into the single SCR911 
Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) resulted in cost savings and improved 
efficiency. His exact response was, “Absolutely, yes.”  
                                            
53 Dennis Kidd, email message to author, January 13, 2014. 
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It is difficult to determine exact dollar amounts of cost savings or increases 
due to inconsistent variables that existed between the founding agencies before 
consolidation. For example, each pre-consolidation 9-1-1 center had varying 
levels of cost associated with personnel pay and benefits, 9-1-1 call volume, 
facilities and maintenance. Some performed ancillary duties outside of the core 
9-1-1 dispatch function, which were not carried over to SCR911. However, some 
generalized and objective cost comparisons can be made. 
When asked how a 9-1-1 center becomes “most efficient,” SCR911 
General Manager Dennis Kidd stated, “You do that by only having personnel on 
duty when you need them.”54  Being that personnel costs are the most 
substantial cost for any 9-1-1 center, the number of personnel required to be on 
duty at any given time in order to provide effective 9-1-1 dispatch services for the 
service area is a strong measure of overall cost efficiency. For the SCR911 
service area, that number was significantly less post-consolidation.   
SCR911 dispatcher staffing ranges from 10 during peak hours down to 
only 5 during the slowest hours. Prior to the SCR911 consolidation, the total 
number of dispatchers on duty at all hours of the day and night was 10–13.55  
This was the case because, regardless of actual emergency call volume, a 
minimum number of dispatchers must be present in each 9-1-1 Center to answer 
emergency calls that might come. Overall, SCR911 staffing is approximately 60 
percent less than the combined staff of the pre-consolidation 9-1-1 centers.56  
The SCR911 consolidation therefore reduced the overall number of dispatchers 
required to handle the regional emergency call volume, indicating a 
corresponding reduction in personnel costs. As well, each pre-consolidation 9-1-
1 center required varying levels of administrative personnel—managers, 
supervisors, administrative support personnel. By merging these separate 
organizations, administrative staffing levels decreased. Notably, the executive 
                                            




managers of the pre-consolidation 9-1-1 centers were sworn law enforcement or 
fire service officers. This costly, sworn 9-1-1 center management has now been 
reduced to a single, less-costly non-sworn SCR911 manager through 
consolidation. Through its “civilianization” of 9-1-1 center executive leadership, 
SCR911 has both reduced the cost of administration and installed a more 
narrowly focused, specialized and experienced executive leader. For the Santa 
Cruz County region, this appears to be a more cost efficient and effective model 
of organizational design. 
One qualitative measure of improved efficiency related to the SCR911 
consolidation is its continued growth and buy-in from regional public safety 
agencies. As mentioned, SCR911 originally comprised only its four “member” 
agencies.57  The successful addition of numerous user agencies since its 
inception indicates a level of improved efficiency and effectiveness by SCR911. 
Agencies have “outsourced” their 9-1-1 dispatch services to SCR911 because it 
provides at least the same level of service for a lower cost than these agencies 
can provide independently. This continued growth also indicates SCR911 has not 
yet “outgrown” its ability to operate more efficiently than a smaller, independent 
9-1-1 Center. In other words, this consolidated organization has not become so 
large, unwieldy, or unmanageable that its mere size creates a paradoxical effect 
upon economies of scale - negatively impacting efficiency. 
Several agencies have turned to SCR911 for ancillary services as well. 
One example involves the police departments of the cities of Santa Cruz, 
Capitola, and Watsonville. They now share the cost of a modern police records 
management system (RMS), fully managed and operated by SCR911. SCR911 
also now provides a regional mobile (in-car) data computer system shared by 
these law agencies, something none had pre-consolidation. While some 
additional services fit well into the SCR911 shared-cost model, not all ancillary 
                                            
57 SCR911 defines “member agencies” as the four founding jurisdictions that now own the 
JPA and make up the governing board. Agencies contracting with SCR911 for service are 
referred to as “user agencies.” 
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“support” functions can be adopted and managed more efficiently. For example, 
member law agencies explored the possibility of contracting all police records 
management functions with SCR911. This idea was ultimately abandoned due to 
the nature of duties performed by records personnel within the individual 
agencies. All performed additional customer service functions that required them 
to remain physically on-site, such as walk-in customer service and internal 
administrative support. 
Actual cost saving associated with the SCR911 consolidation model is 
evidenced by the significant savings enjoyed by the county of San Benito 
immediately upon entering into a contract for 9-1-1 dispatch services. Table 4 
shows San Benito County’s budgeted expenditures for 9-1-1 communications for 
the three most recent fiscal years. For fiscal year (FY) 2010–2011, prior to 
contracting for services, 9-1-1 communications center personnel costs for the 
county totaled $1,385,346. These costs dropped to $919,906 in FY11/12, which 
included the first partial year of the contract with SCR911. The costs dropped to 
$499,311 for FY12/13. This represents a 64% cost reduction. 
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Salaries & Benefits  
Salaries 883,801 307,358 - 
Temp. Salaries - 28,815 33,561 
Overtime Wages 70,922 40,803 - 
FICA/Medicare 70,250 29,852 2,567 
Group Insurance 96,738 26,093 - 
Unemployment Insurance 1,624 22,421 9,000 
Workers Comp 13,248 4,209 - 
PERS Retirement 161,548 47,503 - 
OPEB Charges 87,215 21,325 - 
Salary and Benefit 
Savings
- - 10,000 
Subtotal 1,385,346 528,379 55,128 
SCR911 Services - 391,527 444,183 
Total Expenditures 1,385,346 919,906 499,311 
 
Another metric commonly used to measure costs of 9-1-1 dispatch 
services is the cost per 9-1-1 emergency call. Here again, this figure is often 
difficult to compare equitably across 9-1-1 centers, because each is unique and 
has differing variables built into overall costs. For example, as a stand-alone 
agency, SCR911 must pay for utilities, landscaping, cleaning and maintenance—
all costs included within its total budget.  9-1-1 centers that belong to an 
individual local government may have some or all of these costs paid by another 
department. 
                                            
58  “County of San Benito California: Adopted Budget for Fiscal Year 2012–2013.” 
 29 
The simplest calculation for determining cost per 9-1-1 emergency call is 
to divide the entire 9-1-1 center budget by the number of emergency calls it 
answers each year. For SCR911, that amount is approximately $5.80 per call. 
However, this simple cost figure is not used to determine the cost charged to 
each agency. A more complex formula has been developed, incorporating 
numbers of both telephone transactions and dispatch incidents, to more 
accurately charge each agency according to the workload associated with their 
specific jurisdiction. Based upon this formula, the average cost for the four 
member agencies is approximately $8 per call, and the per-call cost for user 
agencies ranges from $13 to $22. Table 5 presents the SCR911 per-incident cost 
formulations for 2012. 










Aptos 60,730.00$         2328 26.09$           4097.28 14.82$          
Ben Lomond 9,413.00$           343 27.44$           603.68 15.59$          
Boulder Creek 18,768.00$         715 26.25$           1258.4 14.91$          
B40 4,650.00$           127 36.61$           223.52 20.80$          
Central 122,673.00$      4202 29.19$           7395.52 16.59$          
Felton 15,528.00$         581 26.73$           1022.56 15.19$          
Scotts Valley 43,709.00$         1646 26.55$           2896.96 15.09$          
Zayante 6,256.00$           161 38.86$           283.36 22.08$          
AMR 457,944.00$      19631 23.33$           34550.56 13.25$          
Santa Cruz 1,223,640.00$   109254 11.20$           192287.04 6.36$            
County 1,351,369.00$   96121 14.06$           169172.96 7.99$            
Capitola 395,848.00$      19551 20.25$           34409.76 11.50$          
Watsonville 811,987.00$      65015 12.49$           114426.4 7.10$            




                                            
59 Dennis Kidd, email message to author, December 20, 2013. 
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Although user agencies pay a higher per-call cost, their overall cost for 
services remains low as compared to the cost of operating their own 9-1-1 
center. For example, the combined cost paid by all 11 fire districts to SCR911 is 
approximately $300,000. This represents only .9% of their combined agency 
budgets. 
C. LEVEL OF SERVICE 
The general effect of PSAP amalgamation upon service levels to both 
internal and external customers was explored. Specifically, the SCR911 General 
Manager was asked about the effect upon response times, quality of 
communications with field units, coordination of resources, and the satisfaction 
levels of member and user agencies. As well, a review of available quantitative 
quality of service measures was conducted. 
1. Customer Service 
General Manager Kidd explained that the amalgamation of many 9-1-1 
centers into the SCR911 JPA has changed the view of who their “customers” 
actually are. Independent 9-1-1 centers often define their primary customer as 
the citizens of the community which the agency serves. SCR911 management 
and staff still care about the public and strive to provide them with the best 
customer service possible, however they no longer view the public as their 
primary customer. As an agency focused solely on providing a specific type of 
public safety services to multiple public safety agencies, SCR911 now considers 
their member and user agencies as their primary customers.   
Because of that perspective and focus, the level of service provided 
to the public safety agencies became the top priority and has, 
therefore, naturally improved. Of course, part of making our primary 
customers happy also means serving the public exceedingly well.60   
From the member/user agencies’ perspective, they enjoy the benefit of no 
longer having the burden of managing a 9-1-1 center. The pre-consolidation 9-1-
                                            
60 Kidd, interview. 
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1 centers, as is typical throughout the industry, placed a sworn police 
commander at the helm—in charge of a fully civilianized, IT-heavy, mostly non-
law enforcement function, of which (s)he knows virtually nothing about. 
Compounding the issue, these sworn commanders were rotated through various 
command assignments every two to three years, allowing none the time to 
develop real expertise in 9-1-1 center administration.  “This stifled progressive 
development of the organization and was terribly inefficient in most cases.”61 
For SCR911, the term “response time” refers to the amount of time 
between the receipt of a 9-1-1 emergency call and the time field units are 
dispatched. In life and death situations, seconds matter and therefore response 
times can be critical. In Santa Cruz and San Benito counties, as is the case 
throughout California, law agencies were the “primary” PSAP prior to the creation 
of SCR911; all 9-1-1 calls were routed to the individual law enforcement 9-1-1 
centers. The fire agencies operated individual “secondary” PSAPs, housed in a 
completely separate facility. So, when a 9-1-1 call involved a medical emergency 
it was answered and screened first by the law agency then manually routed to 
the secondary Fire agency PSAP. This rerouting of emergency calls consumes 
precious seconds of response time, which increases the time between a citizen’s 
call for help and the on-scene administration of life saving emergency medical 
care. SCR911 is the single PSAP for all member and user agencies, both law 
and fire, so there is no rerouting of emergency calls required. In this sense, 
SCR911 has improved the fire/EMS response times. 
Besides call routing time saved through having only a single PSAP, the 
mere fact that the 9-1-1 call is answered by a call-taker sitting only a few feet 
from the radio dispatcher saves additional time. The radio dispatcher hears the 
call-taker answering and immediately alerts the appropriate Fire agency both 
over the radio and by sending an audible tone alert to the fire station. General 
Manger Dennis Kidd estimated the (1) combination of the elimination of call 
                                            
61 Ibid. 
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routing to secondary PSAP and (2) consolidation of personnel into the same 
physical space has reduced emergency Fire call response times by 20–30 
seconds. In this way, the amalgamation of multiple agencies’ PSAPs into the 
single SCR911 organization provides quicker response times for the Fire 
discipline. 
SCR911 has also developed a Quality Unit focused on overall quality 
assurance and improvement: 
The Quality Unit is responsible for quantifying the Authority’s 
performance by facilitating performance data analysis to determine 
equipment, procedural, and training needs; designing and 
proctoring the annual customer service satisfaction survey; guiding, 
staffing, and measuring the Authority’s participative Task Team 
processes; maintaining the Authority’s accreditation efforts; and 
coordinating the development, approval, and distribution of the 
Authority’s policies and procedures.62 
A component of the Quality Unit involves administering customer service 
satisfaction surveys, which run on a three year cycle. Each year, these surveys 
focus on one of three stakeholder groups: internal—SCR911 employees; 
external—member and user agency personnel; and the community. However, in 
an effort to measure the potential quality-of-service impacts associated with the 
recent assumption of 9-1-1 dispatch services for San Benito County and the city 
of Hollister, the Quality Unit conducted two surveys in 2012—surveys of both the 
community and the external user agencies. Results of these two surveys 
therefore may provide some indication of whether PSAP consolidation positively 
or negatively affects quality of service. However, it must be noted that the 
community surveys involve a low sampling rate; and the same respondents are 
not involved from one survey year to the next. 
The 2012 Users Survey obtained data from 98 respondents.63  
Respondents represented the full spectrum of user agency personnel: line level 
                                            
62 Santa Cruz Regional 9-1-1, 2012 Annual Report, 12. 
63 Ibid., 31–37. 
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first responders, first line supervisors, and managers.  Forty-five percent of 
respondents were primary users—line level police officers and firefighters. 
Respondents were asked to grade the quality of various SCR911 service 
components, using a grading scale of “A, B, C, D, F,” with “A” being the highest 
and “F” being the lowest.  85% of respondents graded the overall performance of 
SCR911 dispatchers as either “A” or “B,” indicating a high satisfaction level. 
However, this was 10% lower than the previous year’s result. The comparable 
2011 Users Survey showed 95% of respondents grading overall satisfaction as 
either “A” or “B.”64 
The 2012 Community Survey obtained data from 50 respondents, a low 
representative sample.65   Respondents were all community members who had 
called SCR911 for some sort of emergency.  Ninety-eight percent of respondents 
indicated the competence level of the dispatcher they spoke with as either 
“expert” or “capable.”  Ninety-four percent indicated the dispatcher’s attitude was 
either “caring” or “polite.”   Regarding overall satisfaction with the customer 
service provided, 87% described the experience as either “exceeded 
expectations” or “satisfied.”  These survey results indicate a very high level of 
satisfaction with SCR911 service by the community, which was consistent with 
previous survey results. The last Community Survey was conducted in 2009 and 
involved 90 respondents.66  Ninety-five percent of those responded with 
favorable overall customer service ratings.   
Another function of the Quality Unit is to monitor and maintain standards 
for training, policies and procedures, emergency preparedness, and quality of 
service required for certification/accreditation by professional organizations. 
SCR911 attained accreditation for its law 9-1-1 call-taking and dispatch 
                                            
64 Santa Cruz Regional 9-1-1, Santa Cruz Regional 9-1-1, 2011 Annual Report (Santa Cruz, 
CA: Santa Cruz Regional 9-1-1, 2012) 28, 31–49, 
http://www.scr911.org/downloads/files/2011report.pdf. 
65 Santa Cruz Regional 9-1-1, 2012 Annual Report, 38–39. 
66  Santa Cruz Regional 9-1-1, 2009 Annual Report (Santa Cruz, CA: Santa Cruz Regional 
9-1-1, 2010), 36–37, http://www.scr911.org/downloads/files/Annual%20Report%202009.pdf. 
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operations through the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement 
Agencies (CALEA) in 2004 and again in 2010. SCR911 is currently the only 
CLAEA accredited 9-1-1 Center in California.67 
CALEA is recognized as an industry leader for the development and 
certification of standards for law enforcement services. It was created in 1979 as 
a credentialing authority through the joint efforts of several major law 
enforcement executive associations: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 
National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives, National Sheriff’s 
Association, and the Police Executive Research Forum.68  CALEA certifies law 
enforcement 9-1-1 centers through its Public Safety Communications 
Accreditation program. The purported benefits of accreditation are listed here. 
 CALEA Accreditation requires the communications center or unit to 
develop a comprehensive, well thought out uniform set of written 
directives. This is one of the most successful methods for reaching 
administrative and operational goals, while also providing direction 
to personnel. 
 CALEA Accreditation standards provide the necessary reports and 
analyses a CEO needs to make fact-based, informed management 
decisions. 
 CALEA Accreditation requires a preparedness program be put in 
place—so a communications center is ready to address natural or 
man-made unusual occurrences. 
 CALEA Accreditation is a means for developing or improving upon 
a communications center’s relationship with the community or the 
agencies it services. 
 CALEA Accreditation strengthens an agency’s accountability, both 
within the agency and the community, through a continuum of 
standards that clearly define authority, performance, and 
responsibilities. 
 Being CALEA Accredited can limit a communications center’s 
liability and risk exposure because it demonstrates that 
internationally recognized standards for public safety 
                                            
67 “SCR911 Accreditation,” Santa Cruz Regional 9-1-1, accessed January 13, 2014, 
http://www.scr911.org/about/accreditation.html. 
68 “The Commission,” CALEA,” accessed November 24, 2013, 
http://www.calea.org/content/commission. 
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communications have been met, as verified by a team of 
independent outside CALEA-trained assessors. 
 CALEA Accreditation facilitates an agency’s pursuit of professional 
excellence.69 
None of the original pre-consolidation 9-1-1 centers is known to have had 
dedicated staff for quality assurance, attained accreditation(s), nor conducted 
customer service surveys. Therefore, at a minimum, the economies of scale with 
regard to personnel hours and the focused leadership achieved through the 
SCR911 consolidation have allowed for a consistent focus on quality-of-service 
assurance and improvement. Based upon these measures, Kidd believes 
SCR911 has both reduced costs and improved quality-of-service. 
2. Agency-Specific Issues—Local Control 
An area explored for this case study was how unique, agency-specific 
service issues are addressed within the consolidated 9-1-1 center model. 
Agency-specific issues include community and individual agency operational 
expectations that SCR911 is required address differently between its member 
and user agencies. The intent here is to identify how SCR911 has managed the 
level of jurisdictional “local control” over its internal operational standards and 
procedures. 
SCR911 strives to avoid and discourage the adoption of agency specific 
operational controls and personnel management through its governance 
structure. This includes the development of standardized operational policy 
through its Users Committee and discipline-specific Task Teams. Governance 
structure is discussed in more detail in Section E of this chapter. Agency-specific 
controls are primarily left to the individual agencies to manage and enforce. For 
example, if a specific law agency requires that only two patrol units may engage 
in a high-speed pursuit, it is up to that agency’s field supervisor(s) to enforce that 
policy as a pursuit begins and develops. In this example, SCR911 would remain 
                                            
69 “Public Safety Communications Accreditation,” CALEA,” accessed November 24, 2013., 
http://www.calea.org/content/public-safety-communications-accreditation. 
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focused on managing the radio traffic and respond to the requests and direction 
of the field supervisor accordingly.   
While the standardization of 9-1-1 center procedures across all user 
agencies would seem to be the epitome of efficiency and is a goal of 9-1-1 center 
consolidation, the reality of differing agency expectations cannot be ignored. 
While governance structure has allowed SCR911 to generally standardize 
operations, some unique, agency-specific policies do remain. Those policies are 
difficult to change because the practices are deeply tied to an agency’s long-
established culture. Agency-specific policies may not be most efficient for 
SCR911 internally; however, imposing the desired change(s) may be so 
disruptive to the affected public safety agency that it outweighs the purported 
benefits to SCR911. As General Manager Kidd described, “We are not going to 
be able to change a culture that has developed over a 100 years; so, in some 
cases, we are just going to have to adapt and accept it.”70 
A classic example of a non-standardized, agency-specific practice that is 
deeply connected to an agency’s culture is the format of their “call signs,” or radio 
identifiers. These are short verbal identifiers, often containing only a few alpha-
numeric characters, which each field unit uses to identify him or herself over the 
radio. Often, the particular format of these identifiers provides valuable implicit 
information, such as the unit’s assigned geographic area and working hours 
(shift). For example, one law agency uses an identifier based upon shift then 
beat, such as “2-1” for Second Watch (shift), Beat 2 (area); while another agency 
simply uses their individual badge numbers, giving no indication of where or 
when they work. The differences sometimes correlate to an agency’s culture of 
how units are expected to be dispatched. One SCR911 law agency has a much 
more geographically based, “beat-centric” culture than another. In other words, 
dispatchers are expected to recognize that only the geographically-assigned 
officer(s) should handle a call-for-service in that specific beat; whereas, in 
                                            
70 Kidd, interview. 
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another jurisdiction, the law agency prefers to send any available unit regardless 
of beat assignment. SCR911 has been unsuccessful at convincing its member 
and user agencies to convert their call signs over to a regional standard. Only 
training and experience allows dispatchers to become familiar with the various 
call sign formats, and the underlying cultural meaning, for each agency. For this 
reason, SCR911 requires new dispatchers to be certified on only two out of the 
five law channels (each law agency operates on its own radio channel) to satisfy 
their probationary training requirements. They learn the idiosyncrasies of the 
remaining channels as they gain more experience as permanent employees.  
When an agency-specific policy is adopted, the first approach is to 
completely remove the impact to the dispatcher through the use of technology, if 
possible. For example, one law agency requested that officers not be advised of 
9-1-1 hang-ups from payphones.71  This request was unique, as all other law 
agencies require these advisements. SCR911 was able to handle this unique 
request by designing their computer aided dispatch (CAD) software to 
automatically “close” these incidents without routing them to the dispatcher work 
stations. The call-takers answer these 9-1-1 calls and enter them into the CAD 
system for possible dispatch just as they do for all 9-1-1 hang-ups, but the 
incident is automatically closed and never routed for dispatching. 
When an agency-specific operational control cannot be completely 
mitigated through technology, it must be codified in SCR911 policy manuals and 
managed through training and regular reminders to staff. SCR911 has an 
electronic message board “ticker” at the front of the dispatch room that scrolls 
through recent policy changes and training material to help remind dispatchers of 
recent policy changes and unique agency-specific procedures. 
Geography is another aspect that sets jurisdictions apart. Each jurisdiction 
comprises its own set of streets, bridges, hills, residential areas, and business 
                                            
71 A 9-1-1 hang-up is a call made to 9-1-1 that is terminated by the caller either before or 
immediately upon being answered by a SCR911 call-taker. Such calls are often false and a 
nuisance for first responder agencies. 
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districts. The challenge of dispatching public safety personnel throughout terrain 
that is unique and unfamiliar to the SCR911 dispatcher has been overcome with 
advanced mapping technology. SCR911 maintains current databases for 
addresses, which includes common names of businesses, and has state-of-the-
art geographic information systems (GIS) mapping. These, coupled with an 
advanced CAD system, provide instant access to location information. One of the 
primary concerns voiced as San Benito County considered outsourcing 9-1-1 
dispatch services to SCR911 was that the new dispatchers would not “know the 
area” and therefore be unable to provide the level of service to which the 
community was accustomed. This proved to be a non-issue because of 
SCR911’s GIS and CAD systems. 
There have also been instances involving employee performance issues 
where a user agency supervisor or manager believes they have authority to 
influence how those personnel matters will be handled. This is not the case. As 
an independent agency, all SCR911 personnel matters must be addressed 
internally and confidentially by SCR911 management. As well, user agency 
supervisors at times will attempt to direct SCR911 supervisors to provide a 
certain level of staffing for a planned event. User agencies do not have authority 
to set SCR911 staffing levels. Instead, users are asked to simply present their 
dispatch needs and allow SCR911 management to determine the appropriate 
level of staffing to handle the anticipated workload. On the other end of the 
spectrum, user agencies sometimes fail to advise SCR911 altogether of planned 
events (enforcement missions, training operations, etc.) that significantly impact 
staffing needs. 
D. INTEROPERABILITY 
The effects of the SCR911 amalgamation of 9-1-1 centers upon 
communications interoperability were discussed, including both voice radio 
communications and data sharing. Interoperability has been defined as: 
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the ability of public safety service and support providers—law 
enforcement, firefighters, EMS, emergency management, the public 
utilities, transportation, and others—to communicate with staff from 
other responding agencies, to exchange voice and/or data 
communication on demand and in real time.72 
The consolidation of previously separate 9-1-1 centers within Santa Cruz 
County did not include a corresponding consolidation of radio channels; each 
user agency generally still operates on its own radio channel, staffed by a 
dispatcher. Therefore, SCR911 has not achieved complete voice radio 
interoperability across all user agencies. However, soon after consolidation 
occurred, SCR911 successfully merged the member fire agencies and the 
regional EMS ambulance provider, American Medical Response, onto a single 
radio channel. Each had previously operated on separate channels while at the 
same time responding to the same emergency incidents. They now communicate 
directly, in real time, to coordinate overall fire/EMS emergency response and 
resources. Actual voice radio interoperability between these two disciplines now 
exists and can be attributed to the amalgamation of area 9-1-1 centers. 
Data communications interoperability was greatly improved as an effect of 
the SCR911 consolidation. Prior to the formation of SCR911, none of the 
participating agencies had mobile data computers (MDC) in their police or fire 
vehicles, and none of their 9-1-1 centers had a CAD system. SCR911 made 
those new technologies economically feasible; and the systems were purchased 
and implemented soon after its formation. Later, because of the successful 
resource sharing model SCR911 had demonstrated, three of its member law 
agencies turned to SCR911 for the purchase and administration of a shared 
records management system (RMS). Santa Cruz Police Department, Watsonville 
Police Department, and Capitola Police Department funded a separate, 
dedicated RMS budget through SCR911 to create the Santa Cruz Metro Records 
System. This shared RMS provides the agencies a common platform for 
                                            
72 “Why Can’t We Talk?: Working Together To Bridge the Communications Gap To Save 
Lives,” National Task Force on Interoperability, accessed October 16, 2013, 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/html/cd_rom/tech_docs/pubs/WhycantwetalkNTFIGuide.pdf. 
 40 
managing and sharing data in real time. For example, when an offender is 
arrested by the Santa Cruz Police Department, his or her arrest data is 
accessible by the Capitola Police Department. SCR911 has now successfully 
administered this system for several years and is in the process of a major 
system upgrade, using SCR911 in-house IT staff. In this sense, SCR911 has 
expanded its core function to include some level of IT support for the member 
agencies.   
Because of SCR911, all user agencies have access to a modern, powerful 
CAD and MDC system, and three member law agencies share an RMS that 
improves data interoperability. Together, these systems have greatly enhanced 
the ability of all member agencies to communicate data. 
E. GOVERNANCE 
SCR911, which was first named Santa Cruz Consolidated Emergency 
Communications Center, was established on July 1, 1991. It is an independent 
government agency, known as a Joint Powers Authority (JPA), governed and 
funded by its four founding member agencies: the county of Santa Cruz, and 
cities of Santa Cruz, Watsonville, and Capitola.73  The executive managers of 
these jurisdictions comprise the SCR911 Board of Directors. This four-member 
board establishes and approves the SCR911 annual budget, and approves 
certain fiscal and personnel policies. However, the board has no input or control 
over SCR911 operations. This is preferred, from General Manager Kidd’s 
perspective. 
Only high-level, top County and City executives approve budget 
matters, while police and fire chiefs approve operations. I do not 
have a police chief disputing the budget because he dislikes the 
way the Center is being run; nor do I have a city manager—far 
removed from public safety operations—directing our 9-1-1 
dispatch operations. The Board does not micro-manage operations 
                                            
73 “Communications Administrative Policy/Procedure: Statutory Authority for Establishment” 
Santa Cruz Consolidated Emergency Communications Center, accessed January 20, 2013, 
http://www.scr911.org/policies/200/210.pdf. 
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at all. They approve the budget and empower me to manage 
operations.74   
Operational policies are approved by the SCR911 User Committees, 
which consist of the police and fire chiefs of the member/user agencies.   Below 
the User Committees are two discipline-specific Task Teams: Fire/EMS Task 
Team and Law Task Team. The Task Teams are working groups composed of 
line level supervisors and mid-managers. These teams do the hands-on policy 
development work, submitting their final product to the User Committees for 
approval and adoption. This overall governance structure establishes 
compartmentalized areas of expertise and authority, keeping everyone focused 
within their own scope.   
“The Board cares about the budget and personnel rules; Users care about 
operational policies. The Task Teams are actually developing those policies 
because they have firsthand knowledge and will be responsible for implementing 
them on a daily basis.”75  Through the User Committees and Task Teams, 
SCR911 strives to achieve uniform agreement across agencies and incorporate 
“local control” into Center operations. 
F. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 
With the JPA model, there are two general approaches toward employee 
relations once a consolidation effort is underway. One approach is based solely 
upon the cost-savings motivation. This approach puts existing employees on 
notice that their jobs are not guaranteed post-consolidation; that everyone is 
encouraged to apply for the new positions being created under the JPA, but 
fewer employees will be necessary and not all will be hired. The second 
approach is founded more upon the improved service level motivation of 
consolidation. With this approach, all existing employees are offered positions 
within the new agency. The founding member agencies of SCR911 chose the 
                                            
74 Kidd, interview. 
75 Ibid. 
 42 
latter approach both for the original formation of the JPA, and for the recent 
incorporation of San Benito County 9-1-1 dispatch services. 
The “grandfathering in” of existing employees saved painful layoffs and 
provided a more politically palatable approach for elected officials. However, this 
approach presented a whole new set of challenges to the organizational behavior 
of the new agency that was created. Because of a general lack of support for the 
consolidation effort by all involved employee bargaining groups, there was no 
employee participation or input in the initial formation of the JPA or the 
development of its early policies and procedures. The SCR911 consolidation was 
very much a “top down” initiative at the start. The first JPA employee was a 
general manager, who in turn hired a technical expert, followed by a support 
services manager, and finally the line level supervisors and dispatchers. 
Employees that moved over into the JPA carried with them their existing 
organizational identities. Dispatchers from SCPD, for example, had long-
established identities associated with the city of Santa Cruz and were 
comfortable with that organization’s culture and operational practices. Placing a 
dispatcher with a strong SCPD organizational identity at the WPD dispatch desk 
was often met with significant resistance. As well, many of the existing 
employees that transitioned into the JPA experienced pay and benefit reductions 
that caused them stress and frustration. The real or perceived cost savings 
attributed to consolidation go toward the member agencies and are lost upon 
employees—there is no corresponding increase in pay and benefits to 
employees. The overall organizational identity crisis and employee tensions 
presented to managers immediately upon the creation of SCR911 proved one of 
the most significant challenges to overcome. 
Adjusting to the dramatic changes involved with transitioning from existing 
employers to the new JPA was stressful for employees, and many had a difficult 
time accepting the consolidation. Technical issues associated with brand new, 
unfamiliar IT systems, dispatching for a city or county an employee had never 
visited, learning new procedures of other jurisdictions while being pulled away 
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from those that employees knew instinctively; for many, the change was 
untenable. The resulting high employee attrition rate was unanticipated and the 
new agency soon faced a staffing challenge. The more politically palatable 
approach toward consolidation—guaranteeing jobs to existing employees—had 
the paradoxical effect of creating serious employee vacancy problems as large 
numbers soon resigned from the new agency. 
The employee satisfaction and retention problems improved with the 
passage of time. As a new, independent agency, the JPA had much more flexible 
personnel hiring processes and rules than those of the pre-consolidation 9-1-1 
centers. The board approved a “rule of the list” hiring process, which allowed 
management to hire qualified personnel regardless of their ranking on a hiring 
list. Any candidate that passed the initial entry examination was placed on the 
hiring list and could be considered for hire. The ability to select new dispatchers 
from anywhere on the list, as opposed to the more rigid rank-based selection 
process used previously, allowed SCR911 to be more selective with regard to 
those personnel traits that best fit the desired organizational culture. As new 
dispatchers were hired and inculcated into the organization, the JPA began to 
develop its own culture. General Manager Kidd explained: 
We have, over time, developed a ‘culture of excellence.’  It took us 
a long time, but through this process, we have established an 
incredible group of people working here; people whom we have 
trained to become very good dispatchers. So, our culture is just 
phenomenal right now. 
G. POLITICS 
The persons most responsible for leading the consolidation of regional 9-
1-1 centers were the Santa Cruz County administrative officer76 and the Santa 
Cruz city manager. These two executive managers championed the effort and 
                                            
76 The county administrative officer is responsible for the preparation and supervision of the 
county’s budget, legislative analysis, contract and grant administration, intergovernmental 
relations, supervision of non-elected department heads, and oversight of all departmental 
functions. 
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drove it to fruition. However, the executive managers of the other two founding 
member jurisdictions, Watsonville and Capitola, also played instrumental roles in 
the successful creation of the JPA.   These four executives, and not the public 
safety department heads, provided the leadership required to foster collaboration 
across jurisdictional boundaries and drive such significant change. 
Public safety department heads generally opposed the concept of 
consolidation, because of the perceived loss of control they would experience. 
Each was comfortable having full operational control over their individual 9-1-1 
centers. Perhaps the most vocal opponent was the Santa Cruz County sheriff, 
who campaigned against the effort and went so far as to direct deputies to initiate 
simultaneous vehicle stops en masse with the purpose of overwhelming the new 
9-1-1 center’s radio call capacity. While there was political resistance of this sort 
initially, it faded with time. The JPA has now been successfully operating for so 
many years that it has simply become the norm. No elected officials remain that 
know any different arrangement for 9-1-1 center operations and none have 
raised any concerns with SCR911 cost or performance levels. 
The primary motivation behind the consolidation effort for local 
government executives was the potential cost savings. Emergency 
communications and inter-agency coordination problems that became apparent 
during the response to the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989 was a secondary 
driver, with emergency communications center consolidation viewed as a positive 
step toward improved public safety response to large scale disasters.77 
H. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
When asked what other models of 9-1-1 center consolidation exist, 
General Manager Kidd referred to the “contract services model.”  Under this 
                                            
77 The Loma Prieta earthquake centered in the Santa Cruz (CA) Mountains in the forest of 
Nisene Marks State Park, about 16 kilometers northeast of Santa Cruz and about 7 kilometers 
south of Loma Prieta Mountains. This major, 6.9 magnitude earthquake caused 63 deaths, 3,757 
injuries, and an estimated $6 billion in property damage. It was the largest earthquake to occur on 
the San Andreas Fault since the great San Francisco earthquake in April 1906. 
 45 
model, one existing PSAP takes on 9-1-1 Dispatch services for one or more 
other PSAP in the region. This most commonly involves a county agency 
providing services to smaller cities and fire districts. One nearby example is the 
Monterey County (CA) Emergency Communications Center.78  Completely 
owned and operated by Monterey County, this 9-1-1 center provides all police, 
fire, and medical 9-1-1 dispatch services for the unincorporated area and all 
cities within Monterey County. However, the largest city, Salinas, has expressed 
interest in forming an independent 9-1-1 center through under the JPA model in 
an effort to gain more influence and control over 9-1-1 center costs and 
operations. While a JPA is not required for the successful governance of a 
consolidated 9-1-1 Center, in this instance Salinas apparently perceives that 
governance through a JPA will offer a more equitable level of local control for the 
member agencies. 
To close the interview, General Manager Kidd was asked to succinctly 
summarize what he believed was the most significant benefit and the most 
significant challenge associated with SCR911. 
1. Significant Benefit 
General Manager Kidd’s personal assessment is that SCR911 provides 
better service for the member agencies than they had before the consolidation 
and it operates more efficiently: improved service, lower cost. While each 
purported benefit may be more beneficial than the other at any given time, 
SCR911 has been able to accomplish both. For example, before consolidation, 
no PSAP had a CAD system. In 1994, area 9-1-1 centers were still using 
handwritten cards for dispatching calls. The individual centers simply could not 
afford a modern CAD system. Through consolidation and the resulting fiscal 
economies of scale, SCR911 acquired a name brand, state-of-the-art system, 
costing each partner agency only a fraction of the overall cost. With regard to 
                                            
78 “Monterey County Emergency Communications,” Monterey County 911 Fire Police 
Medical, accessed November 8, 2013, http://www.co.monterey.ca.us/911/mc911.htm. 
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service level improvements, General Manager Kidd cited economies of scale for 
personnel resources. SCR911 is continually staffed by a minimum of 6 to 7 
dispatchers, with more during the busier shifts. If there is a major emergency 
incident in any of the member jurisdictions, most, if not all, of these personnel are 
available to assist with the management of that incident. Before consolidation, 
the existing PSAP were staffed with fewer personnel and did not have additional 
personnel resources on hand for major emergency incidents. Therefore, SCR911 
is less likely to be overwhelmed during large-scale emergency incidents. The 
ability to draw upon additional personnel resources and move them between 
jurisdictional radio dispatch channels is a great benefit to all of the user agencies. 
2. Significant Challenge 
From his years of experience, General Manager Kidd feels that the most 
significant challenge created by the SCR911 consolidation is the lack of human, 
face-to-face interface with the end users (first responders). Police officers and 
firefighters rarely take the time to drive to SCR911 and meet the dispatchers. 
This lack of direct, personal interaction between users and dispatchers creates a 
less cohesive working environment. For example, when a police officer knows 
the person on the other end of the radio, he or she will likely be more 
understanding and courteous when addressing perceived errors or omissions. 
Conversely, having never met the dispatcher sometimes fosters a less-sensitive 
approach toward dispatch “problems;” making it easier for both the dispatcher 
and the user to become inconsiderate, rude, or seem uncaring. 
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III. CASE STUDY—CHARLESTON COUNTY CONSOLIDATED 
911 CENTER 
It’s been very challenging, but the progress that we have made 
since 2009 is amazing—it’s absolutely amazing. I can’t imagine not 
having consolidated now. 
—Allyson Burrell, CCC911 deputy director 
reflecting upon the consolidation of multiple PSAP in 
Charleston County, South Carolina 
 
A. BACKGROUND 
Charleston County Consolidated 911 Center (CCC911) is a Public Safety 
Answering Point (PSAP) owned and operated by the County of Charleston, 
South Carolina. It provides 9-1-1 emergency communications services for the 
county and multiple local jurisdictions in the region. CCC911 was established in 
January 2009, after eight local jurisdictions within Charleston County approved 
an Intergovernmental Agreement for consolidation. Upon its completion, CCC911 
consolidated 10 separate dispatch centers: five primary PSAPs, one secondary 
PSAP, and four dispatch-only centers.79  The original participating jurisdictions 
are listed below.80 
 County of Charleston 
 City of North Charleston 
 Town of Mount Pleasant 
 City of Isle of Palms 
 City of Folly Beach 
 Saint John’s Fire Department 
 Saint Andrews Public Service District Fire Department 
                                            
79 A “primary PSAP” is a center that receives and answers 9-1-1 calls directly. A “secondary 
PSAP” is a 9-1-1 center that receives 9-1-1 calls forwarded on from a primary PSAP.  “Dispatch-
only Centers” do not receive 9-1-1 calls, but use information forwarded from a PSAP to dispatch 
field units over the radio.  
80 “Charleston County Consolidated 911 Center—Intergovernmental Agreement,” Charleston 
County, accessed November 12, 2013, 
http://www.charlestoncounty.org/Departments/dispatch/Intergovt%20Agreement.pdf. 
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 James Island Public Service District Fire Department 
With its recent (November 2013) incorporation of the city of Charleston 
Police Department’s 9-1-1 Center, CCC911 now provides all law, fire, and EMS 
9-1-1 dispatch services within Charleston County; no other independent PSAPs 
remain. However, the city of Folly Beach still operates a dispatch-only center for 
its police and fire departments.81  Table 6 presents each of the 21 agencies for 
which CCC911 provides services. 
Table 6.   CCC911 Member Agencies82 
CCC911—Agencies Served 
Law Agencies (6) Fire/Rescue Agencies (14) EMS Agencies (1)
Charleston County 
Sheriff Awendaw Fire Lincolnville Rescue 
Charleston County 
EMS 
City of Charleston 
Police 
Charleston County 
Rescue Mt. Pleasant Fire   
Isle of Palms Police City of Charleston Fire N. Charleston Fire   
Mt. Pleasant Police Dewees Island Fire Sullivan’s Island Fire   
N. Charleston Police Isle of Palms Fire St. Andrews Fire   
Sullivan’s Island 
Police James Island Fire St. John’s Fire   
Lincolnville Fire St. Paul’s Fire 
 
CCC911 comprises 160 employees; with 132 in operational roles and 28 
in support roles. Operations positions include supervisors, call takers, law 
dispatchers and fire/EMS dispatchers. Support positions include the director and 
deputy director, managers, information technology (IT), quality assurance, 
training, analysts, public education, and administrative. The CCC911 staffing 
level has progressively increased as additional agencies joined the consolidation, 
since all existing PSAP personnel were incorporated into CCC911 and became 
county employees. The CCC911 Organizational Chart, Figure 2, provides a 
snapshot of the personnel deployment and organizational structure. 
                                            
81 This is not a PSAP, as 9-1-1 calls from this jurisdiction are answered by CCC911. 
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Figure 2.  CCC911 Organizational Chart for Fiscal Year 2013/14 
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CCC911 dispatchers provide 24-hour coverage that is based upon 
workload, with some shifts staffed more heavily than others. The dispatch staffing 
structure is based upon a 12.25 hour shift schedule, with the .25 hours used for 
shift change briefings. Staffing is divided among four squads, with every other 
weekend off. At the time of this study, CCC911 was near the end of its transition 
to being fully consolidated, with completion planned for January 2014. Tables 7 
and 8 show the personnel deployment by working hours prior to and after the 
final transition, respectively. 
Table 7.   CCC911 Personnel Deployment for 2013 
CCC911 Personnel Deployment 
2013 
Hours Staffing 
0800-1000 5 Call Takers, 17 Dispatchers & Supervisors 
1000-1200 6 Call Takers, 17 Dispatchers & Supervisors 
1200- 2000 7 Call Takers, 17 Dispatchers & Supervisors 
2000-2200 6 Call Takers, 17 Dispatchers & Supervisors 
2200-2400 5 Call Takers, 17 Dispatchers & Supervisors 
2400-0800 4 Call Takers, 17 Dispatchers & Supervisors 
 
Table 8.   CCC911 Personnel Deployment for 2014 
CCC911 Personnel Deployment 
2014 
Hours Staffing 
0800-1000 9 Call Takers, 21 Dispatchers & Supervisors 
1000-1200 10 Call Takers, 21 Dispatchers & Supervisors 
1200-2000 12 Call Takers, 21 Dispatchers & Supervisors 
2000-2200 11 Call Takers, 21 Dispatchers & Supervisors 
2200-2400 10 Call Takers, 21 Dispatchers & Supervisors 





B. BUDGET / EFFICIENCY 
A primary question asked of both Director James Lake and Deputy 
Director Allyson Burrell was whether consolidation of separate 9-1-1 centers 
results in cost savings and improved efficiency.83  Director Lake explained that 
the amalgamation of 9-1-1 centers can save money immediately if there is an 
adequate, existing facility to house the expanded PSAP. If a new facility must be 
designed and constructed, as was the case for CCC911, it requires substantial 
up-front costs ranging from $15 million to $20 million. Another risk to cost savings 
is “mission creep,” or the adoption of other functions outside the original scope of 
the consolidation project. However, over the long term consolidations generally 
reduce costs through the economies of scale realized with regard to personnel 
and technology systems resources. 
As a relatively new consolidated 9-1-1 center, CCC911 has not yet 
realized significant cost savings. This was anticipated, as the consolidation effort 
was focused almost entirely upon improving efficiency and quality-of-service and 
not cost reductions.  9-1-1 center consolidation within Charleston County was 
based upon four motives: (1) improving service, which will save lives, (2) 
providing the most efficient and effective emergency communications possible, 
(3) increasing safety to emergency responders, and (4) enhancing coordination 
amongst responding agencies.84 
One of the quality improvement goals established for the new 
consolidated 9-1-1 center was to attain professional accreditations. To do so, 
many improvements were first needed. A few of the pre-consolidation 9-1-1 
centers were providing an “accreditation level” of service. However, most were 
“understaffed, undertrained, and had poor facilities and outdated equipment.”85  
                                            
83 Lake and Burrell, conference call. 
84 Charleston County, Study Results Show Feasibility of 911 Consolidated Dispatch Center, 
Charleston County, SC: Charleston County, April 11, 2007, 
http://www.charlestoncounty.org/handheld/www/news/archives/2007/2791.htm. 
85 Lake and Burrell, conference call. 
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Several of the Fire centers had no Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system and 
were dispatching by means of handwritten cards. The CCC911 consolidation 
process included major technological upgrades, which improved quality of 
service for all participating agencies. However, along with the upgraded 
technology came the need for enhanced IT support. Charleston County did not 
have the level of IT staff or expertise required to support the new technologies, 
which necessitated the hiring of dedicated IT staff. Director Lake noted, “We 
have come a long way in a short amount of time—improving quality while 
keeping the same price tag.”86 
While enhanced services were the goal, cost savings are also anticipated 
in the long-term. In 2007, before the consolidation, Charleston County 
commissioned a study to examine the feasibility of a regional 9-1-1 center.87  
While the study emphasized the potential quality and service level improvements 
of consolidating the region’s PSAP, it also identified potential cost savings. The 
study recognized that cost savings may not be realized for several years after 
consolidation, due to “startup costs that include renovation/construction costs, 
capital purchases, relocation costs, training, and acclimation of employees to 
new systems and protocols.”88  However, after these initial start-up costs, the 
study suggested cost savings should be realized beginning five years after full 
consolidation in the following areas: 
 Reduction in duplication of services, systems, and support, 
particularly with regard to systems upgrades and/or replacements 
 Operational efficiency and equality in services “through lower 
information and transaction costs. These costs savings are 
measured by convenience of performing tasks, and convenience of 
systems development, maintenance and upgrade/replacement.”89 
                                            
86 Ibid. 
87 L. Robert Kimball & Associates, Countywide Emergency Communications Services 
Consolidation Feasibility Study: Charleston County, South Carolina. (Edinburg, PA: Kimball & 
Associates, April 2007). 
88 Ibid., 160. 
89 Ibid., 161. 
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An example in support of the anticipated long-term cost savings is found 
relative to equipment replacement and maintenance costs. Cost savings will be 
realized from the overall reduction in number of work stations. Prior to the 
CCC911 consolidation, there were 45 work stations (9-1-1 call-taker and 
dispatcher consoles) scattered throughout the existing PSAPs in the region. 
Each work station included desk furniture and computer, telephone, and radio 
equipment, all of which incurs cost for maintenance and support. CCC911 has 
only 36 workstations, an overall reduction of nine. This has reduced the overall 
costs associated with maintaining 9-1-1 workstations in the county, while at the 
same time upgrading all workstations to state-of-the-art equipment, thereby 
improving quality of service while reducing costs. 
A 9-1-1 center’s cost per transaction can be determined by dividing its 
overall operating budget by its total number of transactions. This is a simple 
metric sometimes used to evaluate costs of 9-1-1 dispatch services internally. 
For example, a 9-1-1 center might use this metric to track its own cost efficiency 
from year to year, or to develop a standard per-transaction cost formula for 
charging its member agencies. However, this metric may not be valid for 
comparing cost efficiency from one 9-1-1 center to the next, as differing variables 
are involved on each side of the equation. For example, some agencies consider 
a transaction to be an emergency 9-1-1 telephone call, while others consider it to 
be an emergency incident, or a dispatched “call-for-service.”  These two 
transactions are quite different, as emergency incidents might involve multiple 9-
1-1 calls. For example, vehicle collisions often give rise to numerous 9-1-1 
telephone calls; multiple witnesses call 9-1-1 to report the same emergency 
incident. Additionally, the components of an agency’s operating budget can vary. 
For example, an independent 9-1-1 center may have to pay for facilities 
maintenance and dedicated IT personnel, while a city- or county-owned 9-1-1 
center may not.   
The detailed budget analysis required to make valid per transaction cost 
comparisons between CCC911 and the other two case studies conducted herein 
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was unavailable to this researcher. However, the metric is being provided here 
for reference only. CCC911’s fiscal year 2012 operating budget was $7,199,926. 
Dividing that figure by its total number of emergency telephone calls, 568,965, 
produces a per-call cost figure of $12.65.90  For fiscal year 2013, with an 
increased budget figure of $7,893,068 and fewer emergency calls, the per-call 
cost figure rose to $13.98.91  CCC911 also calculated its cost per dispatched 
emergency incident; which is $14.63.92 
C. LEVEL OF SERVICE 
The general impacts upon service levels, for both CCC911 internal and 
external customers, were examined. Specifically, the CCC911 Director and 
Deputy Director were asked about the consolidation’s effects upon training, 
operational standards, response times, quality of communications with field units, 
regional coordination of resources, and the level of satisfaction perceived by 
internal and external customers. They expressed that the level and quality of 
service has improved as a result of the CCC911 consolidation in each of the 
areas discussed. 
Prior to consolidating the region’s PSAP, the quality of 9-1-1 services 
being provided to citizens within Charleston County varied greatly between each 
local jurisdiction. Each 9-1-1 center had its own new-employee training program 
and continuing education standards. A few had some type of quality assurance 
program while others had none. Turnover of 9-1-1 center staff was also high, 
making it difficult for agencies to maintain minimum staffing levels. Both Director 
Lake and Deputy Director Burrell believe consolidation of the region’s 9-1-1 staff 
has generally improved the quality of 9-1-1 dispatch services for the entire 
region, through the standardization of all training, establishment of a formal 
                                            
90 James Lake (director of Charleston County Consolidated 911 Center) interview with author 
on  “cost per call,” December 31, 2014. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Lake and Burrell, conference call. 
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quality assurance program, equalization of pay/benefit packages, and attainment 
of accreditation from national standards organizations.93 
CCC911 has obtained accreditation for its fire and EMS 9-1-1 call 
operations through the International Academies of Emergency Dispatch (IAED). 
IAED is a recognized authority in 9-1-1 emergency dispatch standards development 
and certifications, with more than 54,000 currently certified members (individuals 
and agencies). The organization’s mission statement reads, “To advance and 
support the public-safety emergency telecommunications professional and ensure 
that citizens in need of emergency, health, and social services are matched 
safely, quickly, and effectively with the most appropriate resource.”94  Its 
published goals for all members are: 
 To use and promote the fundamental principles of the scientific 
method in the pursuit of the Mission. 
 To advocate a single, scientifically defensible protocol which 
becomes the unifying standard under which all professional 
emergency dispatchers practice. 
 To advance professionalism within the dispatch community by 
establishing and promoting an ethics policy as well as minimum 
standards for curriculum, instruction, certification, recertification, 
and accreditation of centers. 
 To provide opportunities for members to improve themselves and 
their organizations through facilitation of communication, providing 
comprehensive information resources and creating high-quality 
training and continuing dispatch education through seminars, 
publications, and other media designed to meet our members’ 
needs. 
 To establish and promote a collegial, research-based culture that 
welcomes the expertise of many disciplines through the creation of 
standing committees, task forces, and subgroups that reach out to 
other organizations and advise the Academies. 
                                            
93 Ibid. 
94 “Organization | National Academies of Emergency Dispatch,” accessed November 24, 
2013, http://www.emergencydispatch.org/Organization. 
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 To be recognized as the authoritative, independent voice that 
represents the emergency dispatcher and enhances the 
profession.95 
Additionally, CCC911 is in the process of obtaining accreditation for its law 
9-1-1 call-taking and dispatch operations through the Commission on 
Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA). CALEA is recognized as 
an industry leader for the development and certification of standards for law 
enforcement services. It was created in 1979 as a credentialing authority through 
the joint efforts of several major law enforcement executive associations: 
International Association of Chiefs of Police, National Organization of Black Law 
Enforcement Executives, National Sheriff’s Association, and the Police Executive 
Research Forum.96  CALEA certifies law enforcement 9-1-1 centers through its 
Public Safety Communications Accreditation program. The purported benefits of 
accreditation are listed here. 
 CALEA Accreditation requires the communications center or unit to 
develop a comprehensive, well thought out uniform set of written 
directives. This is one of the most successful methods for reaching 
administrative and operational goals, while also providing direction 
to personnel. 
 CALEA Accreditation standards provide the necessary reports and 
analyses a CEO needs to make fact-based, informed management 
decisions. 
 CALEA Accreditation requires a preparedness program be put in 
place—so a communications center is ready to address natural or 
man-made unusual occurrences. 
 CALEA Accreditation is a means for developing or improving upon 
a communications center’s relationship with the community or the 
agencies it services. 
 CALEA Accreditation strengthens an agency’s accountability, both 
within the agency and the community, through a continuum of 
standards that clearly define authority, performance, and 
responsibilities. 
                                            
95 Ibid. 
96 “The Commission,” CALEA,” accessed November 24, 2013, 
http://www.calea.org/content/commission. 
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 Being CALEA Accredited can limit a communications center’s 
liability and risk exposure because it demonstrates that 
internationally recognized standards for public safety 
communications have been met, as verified by a team of 
independent outside CALEA-trained assessors. 
 CALEA Accreditation facilitates an agency’s pursuit of professional 
excellence.97 
Certifications by recognized industry accreditation authorities are evidence 
of CCC911’s state-of-the-art training and quality assurance programs. Since 
none of the pre-existing 9-1-1 centers in Charleston County had attained such 
accreditation, and their training and operational standards varied between PSAP, 
this is one potential qualitative indication of an improved level of service being 
provided by CCC911 for all of the communities it serves. Additionally, Deputy 
Director Burrell was employed by the county’s 9-1-1 center prior to consolidation, 
giving her firsthand knowledge of pre- and post-consolidation quality assurance 
efforts. She stated, “We had one person who did quality assurance, but that was 
not their primary job. And, it was basically home-grown quality assurance. We 
didn’t have anything like what the academy [IAED] provides.”98  The quality 
assurance program has increased from one that involves the part-time attention 
of a single employee to one based upon industry standards and involving a 
dedicated staff. 
Director Lake and Deputy Director Burrell explained that, as a result of 
their quality assurance program, improved technology systems, and focus on 
meeting industry standards, CCC911 is exceeding national standards for the time 
it takes to answer 9-1-1 emergency calls. CCC911 has also significantly 
improved overall call processing times, approaching national standards there as 
well. Consequently, CCC911 is dispatching filed units more quickly. The data 
show that fire and EMS response times have been reduced from 10 minutes to 8 
minutes since the amalgamation of 9-1-1 centers, providing one strong 
                                            
97 “Public Safety Communications Accreditation,” CALEA,” accessed November 24, 2013. 
http://www.calea.org/content/public-safety-communications-accreditation. 
98 Lake and Burrell, conference call. 
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quantitative measure of improved service.99  These standards were not being 
met, and, in most cases, were not even possible to be met due to staffing and 
technology limitations before consolidation.   
With regard to internal (users) and external (community) customer 
satisfaction levels, Director Lake indicated they have not yet had the time or 
resources to conduct customer surveys. However, they intend to do so after 
completion of the final phases of consolidation. CCC911 was yet in the process 
of consolidating four additional agencies as this researcher was gathering data. 
One of the primary questions asked of Director Lake and Deputy Director 
Burrell regarded the issue of “local control” within the consolidated environment. 
Namely, how are unique, agency-specific service needs managed?  They 
indicated this can be a challenge, and is something they are currently working 
through with four smaller agencies that will soon transition over to CCC911. 
These agencies serve small communities that are accustomed to a highly 
personalized level of public safety services, so much so that dispatchers and 
community members calling 9-1-1 often already know one another. Successfully 
transitioning these smaller agencies into the large consolidated PSAP will require 
substantial involvement and input from the Consolidated Dispatch Board, which 
is comprised of the chiefs of each public safety agency CCC911 serves. Director 
Lake explained this is the core function of the Consolidated Dispatch Board—the 
very reason it exists. The board is representative of the entire service area, all 
agencies and each discipline, and seeks consensus in order to approve 
operational policies that all participating agencies support. In so doing, one 
argument is that service levels are improved throughout the entire county. While 
there is some give and take at the individual agency level, overall, the entire 
region benefits from improved, standardized levels of service. 
While the Director is an employee of Charleston County, and therefore 
subject to the County Administrator’s direction and authority, it is important to 
                                            
99 Ibid. 
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note the role of the Consolidated Dispatch Board with regard to the evaluation of 
the Director’s performance. The elected chairperson of the Consolidated 
Dispatch Board provides the county administrator “with performance reviews of 
the Center Director and make[s] written recommendations regarding his or her 
performance…with significant input from Board members.”100  This provisional 
authority of the Consolidated Dispatch Board to provide direct feedback to the 
county administrator regarding the director’s performance ensures a level of 
accountability to the Board’s operational policy direction.  
D. INTEROPERABILTY 
The potential benefits to regional voice and data interoperability were 
explored as they pertain to the CCC911 consolidation.   Director Lake and 
Deputy Director Burrell were asked if interoperability was enhanced as a result of 
the consolidation of regional PSAP, and, if so, in what ways. They explained that 
significant progress had already been made toward regional public safety voice 
radio interoperability prior to the consolidation effort. Charleston County had 
developed a shared 800 MHz voice radio system, which was a key component of 
South Carolina’s statewide trunked radio system.101   The CCC911 consolidation 
brought the last two remaining agencies in the county onto the countywide radio 
system, so that all public safety agencies now operate on the same radio system. 
The CCC911 consolidated PSAP was itself identified as a key strategic initiative 
in the Statewide Communications Interoperability Plan, as it was anticipated to 
enhance the public safety data sharing capabilities within the region.102 
CCC911 has improved data communications interoperability in several 
ways. First, even before all PSAP were consolidated, CCC911 acquired and 
implemented a common computer aided dispatch (CAD) system throughout the 
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county.  9-1-1 centers that had not yet physically transitioned into CCC911 still 
used the new common CAD system through virtualization. This allowed all 
agencies to share emergency 9-1-1 call data for the first time. Second, CCC911 
moved all member agencies forward to the same mobile data computer system. 
Field units from different jurisdictions are equipped with in-car computers and 
now share and communicate data to and from the field in real time. Finally, 
CCC911 maintains a data sharing network that connects its member agencies 
with some state and federal partners as well. As Director Lake summarized,  
In a very short amount of time we have made great strides toward 
interoperability, and that is just on the technical side. On the 
operational side, our Board is constantly generating new policies 
and procedures that standardize field operations across the county 
as they relate to communications.103 
Additional work is underway to further enhance data interoperability through the 
creation of a single, shared records management system (RMS) for the partner 
law agencies. CCC911 has already implemented a shared RMS for its Fire and 
EMS partners.  
Technical improvements, coupled with the operational standardization 
being developed by the Board, have enhanced the coordination of public safety 
resources. The CCC911 consolidation has had a direct positive impact upon data 
sharing and the ability to coordinate resources during large scale emergency 
incidents in Charleston County. Director Lake advised that while the countywide 
radio system predates the CCC911 consolidation, all other data interoperability 
improvements have been the direct result of consolidation and likely would not 
have occurred otherwise. 
E. GOVERNANCE 
CCC911 is not an independent agency; it is one of many departments that 
comprise the Charleston County government organization.   Its director is 
therefore a department head and all personnel are employees of Charleston 
                                            
103 Lake and Burrell, conference call. 
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County. CCC911 provides 9-1-1 dispatch services for all other agencies within 
Charleston County through an Intergovernmental Agreement (Appendix A).104  
The agreement sets forth many aspects of the 9-1-1 Center’s initial formation, 
much of it related to governance structure. 
Numerous organizational objectives are set forth in the CCC911 
Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA). Several speak to governance structure:   
 To provide operational oversight by a Consolidated Dispatch Board 
made up of public safety agency leaders 
 To ensure accountability to member agencies by the creation of 
User Groups, which provide input to the Consolidated Dispatch 
Board 
 To provide a mechanism for the addition or withdrawal of parties to 
the agreement 
Additionally, the IGA contains specific sections that codify the 
organizational structure of CCC911 in relation to Charleston County government, 
the responsibility to acquire and maintain a facility, the methodology to address 
various transitional issues, and the composition and authorities of the 
Consolidated Dispatch Board and User Groups. According to the IGA:  
 Charleston County will establish and maintain a Department of 
Public Safety Communications, which will operate the Charleston 
County Consolidated 9-1-1 Center. The County will provide the 
necessary personnel, legal, risk management, and purchasing 
services for CCC911. Leveraging the existing County services in 
this manner will provide administrative cost efficiencies. The Center 
Director and all CCC911 employees will be County employees, 
subject to all County personnel policies and procedures. 
 Charleston County will purchase, lease or construct a facility of 
adequate size to house CCC911. 
 Details of all consolidation transitional issues will be addressed 
through the Consolidated Dispatch Board, including input as to the 
hiring of the Director and the transition of all existing, qualified 
PSAP employees. 
 The Consolidated Dispatch Board will be comprised of two 
representatives each for Charleston County, City of North 
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Charleston, City of Mount Pleasant, plus one rotating 
representative from the remaining participating agencies. Two 
additional representatives will be selected by the Charleston 
County Fire Chiefs Association. Finally, two non-voting members 
will be selected, one as a liaison for the County Administrator and 
one to provide input from allied federal agencies. 
 Two User Groups will be established to provide participating 
agency input into CCC911 operations: the Law Enforcement User 
Group and the Fire/EMS/Rescue/Emergency Management User 
Group. Membership will include the chief of each member agency. 
In addition to the formal structures established through the IGA, Director 
Lake explained that smaller committees are created as needed to examine 
specific issues and help develop policy recommendations. For example, 
interagency committees were formed for some highly technical issues, personnel 
matters, and the design and construction of the new facility. Currently, there is a 
committee helping to develop a CCC911 5-year strategic plan. Director Lake 
emphasized, “We rely heavily upon our users to provide direction in many 
areas.”105 This provides each agency with a level of “local control” over CCC911 
operations and ensures all operational policies are thoroughly vetted for viability 
and general acceptance. 
During early discussions on a possible consolidation of regional PSAP, 
governance structure was explored and subsequently outlined within the 
feasibility study.106  The stakeholder agencies evaluated each option in three key 
areas when deciding upon the form of governance: support structure, 
organizational structure, and level of representation for participating agencies. 
The new 9-1-1 center would require a “backbone structure” to support 
administrative services, such as payroll and other personnel related needs, 
facilities maintenance, budgeting and finance, legal matters, and risk 
management.107  This support structure could be created anew within an 
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107 Ibid., 145. 
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independent consolidated center, resulting in increased autonomy; or an existing 
support structure could be leveraged, which would save administrative costs. The 
stakeholders chose to leverage the existing Charleston County “backbone 
structure.”  An additional component here was Charleston County’s intention to 
acquire the facility needed to house the new 9-1-1 center. In deciding to use the 
existing County support structure and occupy a County building, the new 
consolidated center would be primarily owned by Charleston County. Other 
agencies would therefore “outsource” their 9-1-1 dispatch services to the county. 
With a county-administered 9-1-1 center, the options for organizational 
structure turned toward the formation of representative boards and committees that 
would provide a voice for the various jurisdictions and disciplines agreeing to 
participate in the consolidation effort. These included an executive board, advisory 
board, and steering committees. The stakeholder group further developed these 
recommendations into what became the Consolidated Dispatch Board and User 
Groups. Having chosen an organizational structure, the stakeholders then settled 
upon the specific representative makeup of the Consolidated Dispatch Board and 
User Groups. The first responsibilities of the Consolidated Dispatch Board would be 
to provide input to the County regarding the hiring of the CCC911 director and the 
development of the IGA. Figure 3 presents the general governance structure that 
formed through the approval of the IGA. 
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Figure 3.  CCC911 Consolidated Dispatch Board 
F. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 
Several questions were asked of Director Lake and Deputy Director 
Burrell to elicit information regarding any organizational behavior issues 
associated with the consolidation of 9-1-1 dispatch services, such as support or 
resistance from bargaining groups and cultural differences between disciplines. 
South Carolina is a “right to work” state, and there was no bargaining group 
formed for CCC911 employees.108  Director Lake explained that the absence of 
an organized employee bargaining group was both beneficial and challenging to 
the consolidation process. The primary benefit was the ability to address 
transitional personnel issues, such as pay and benefits, with no organized 
opposition. Paradoxically, the lack of employee organizational structure that a 
union provides made effective management-employee communications for the 
numerous transitional personnel matters more challenging. 
                                            
108 A “right to work” state is one that has enacted laws prohibiting employers from making 
union membership a condition of employment, or so-called “forced unionization.”  
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Deputy Director Burrell identified the merging of cultures as a notable 
challenge throughout the consolidation process. During the initial phase of 
consolidation, after the primary group of agencies had come together, CCC911 
could be described as two distinct co-located PSAP rather than an amalgamated 
group of personnel, due to the strong cultural divide that existed between long-
term Sheriff’s Office and EMS agency personnel. Personnel from the two 
disciplines did not work together whatsoever, even though many of the 
emergency calls received by the law enforcement call-takers were medical in 
nature and therefore immediately transferred to EMS. Cultural divides such as 
this continued with each subsequent phase of consolidation. Each new agency 
that joined CCC911 brought with it personnel having an established 
organizational identity and legacy of differing organizational behaviors. These 
challenges remain, but are subsiding with time. 
Additionally, fewer existing agency employees transferred into CCC911 
than had been anticipated. Some chose not to accept County employment, while 
others resigned relatively soon after hire. Only approximately 50% of existing 
PSAP employees have remained with the new consolidated 9-1-1 center.109  At 
the time of this research, CCC911 was preparing to transition in the City of 
Charleston’s 9-1-1 center Law personnel, which will be the largest and final 
transition. Of the Charleston 9-1-1 center’s 27–29 existing full time employees, 
Deputy Director Burrell expects only 7 or 8 to permanently transfer into CCC911. 
This high attrition rate has created staffing challenges and forced CCC911 to 
vigorously recruit new employees. However, those who do successfully transition 
seem to enjoy the new structure and organization found within CCC911. Having 
come from smaller 9-1-1 centers where employees performed multiple functions, 
they appreciate being able to focus on one role, either 9-1-1 call taking or radio 
dispatching. Deputy Director Burrell explained that they seem to prefer the more 
contemporary, industry-standard call processing model that has been 
established. 
                                            
109 Lake and Burrell, conference call. 
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During the consolidation phases, CCC911 management encouraged the 
involvement of line-level staff in the decision making process often. Examples 
include the establishment of the employee dress code/uniforms and the selection 
of the type of workstation equipment in the new facility. Employees were offered 
positions on work groups and committees that provided input to the User Groups 
during operational policy development as well. Initially, there was active 
participation and buy-in from employees, but this declined in relatively short 
order. Employees simply seemed to lose interest and the work groups dissolved. 
A question asked of Director Lake and Deputy Director Burrell regarded 
any unanticipated challenges and benefits that resulted from the consolidation of 
the region’s 9-1-1 centers. The primary unanticipated challenge involves the 
difficulty of attracting and hiring qualified dispatchers to fill vacancies. For 
example, a recent recruitment drew 800 applications but resulted in fewer than 
20 being hired and starting the training program. Not all will successfully 
complete training and become permanent employees. While the challenge to hire 
qualified dispatchers is not likely unique to CCC911 as a consolidated 9-1-1 
center, it has been magnified by the higher than anticipated number of vacancies 
attributable to the consolidation. 
An unanticipated benefit is the level to which certain existing 9-1-1 center 
employees have embraced the new CCC911 model and made contributions 
toward its success. Some who were initially resistant to the idea of transitioning 
to a consolidated 9-1-1 center have become the most ardent supporters and 
change agents. Several of these people have now moved into supervisorial 
positions or other administrative support roles. A specific example provided 
involved a long-term employee of one of the existing centers who had been 
strongly opposed to the concept of consolidation; she believed it would simply 
not work. After transitioning to CCC911, she soon became a floor supervisor. 
Ultimately, this employee was promoted to a management position and is leading 




Director Lake and Deputy Director Burrell advised that the person most 
responsible for leading the initial drive toward consolidation in Charleston County 
was the chief of police for the city of North Charleston. He strongly supported the 
concept and was responsible for gathering the support of other police chiefs in 
the region. The chief was able to convince North Charleston’s mayor of the value 
of consolidation and gained his support. From there, support began to develop 
amongst the nine elected members of the Charleston County Council. The effort 
was then moved forward by the formation of an exploratory consolidation 
committee comprised of local agency representatives and chaired by North 
Charleston’s chief of police. The committee spurred the commissioning of a 
PSAP consolidation feasibility study, funded by a Department of Homeland 
Security grant and seven local jurisdictions. 
When asked about the primary motivations behind the move toward 9-1-1 
center consolidation, Director Lake indicated cost savings was the least of the 
considerations. The primary motivating factors were the desire to improve the 
quality of 9-1-1 dispatch services, interoperability and information sharing, and 
the coordination of emergency resources. The consolidation effort did not meet 
with political resistance in Charleston County. Rather, because the idea was 
generated at the local public safety agency level and then presented to elected 
officials as an opportunity to improve emergency services throughout the area, 
the consolidation effort enjoyed broad political support. Additionally, with the 
motivation being improved service as opposed to cost savings, the concept 
involved retaining all current 9-1-1 center employees. The absence of a need for 
significant employee lay-offs also likely contributed to the acceptance and 
support of the idea by agency leaders and elected officials. 
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H. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
As CCC911 was in its initial phases of consolidation, management looked 
to another consolidated center in South Carolina as a possible model: 
Spartanburg 9-1-1. Spartanburg 9-1-1 is the sole 9-1-1 center for all of 
Spartanburg County, serving over 80 public safety agencies, and is administered 
by Spartanburg County through its Office of Emergency Services.110  Its 
governance structure is very similar to that of CCC911. Deputy Director Burrell 
advised the two consolidated 9-1-1 centers have developed a positive working 
relationship and often share information in support of one another regarding 
center operations. 
Before being hired as the CCC911 Director, James Lake was employed 
by the consulting firm that conducted the Charleston County Consolidated 
Dispatch Feasibility Study. Deputy Director Burrell explained that hiring a director 
from “outside,” as opposed to hiring a director from one of the existing 9-1-1 
centers or public safety agencies, was the right choice and important to the 
success of the consolidation effort. She explained that having an objective leader 
from “outside,” yet still very familiar with what needed to be done, facilitated the 
fair and equitable implementation of new policies and procedures for the center 
and removed any perceptions of undue influence by a single participating 
agency. 
As a closing question, Deputy Director Burrell was asked to provide her 
perspective on the greatest benefit and greatest challenge of the CCC911 
consolidation. She identified the greatest benefit as the improved information 
sharing that has resulted. When a 9-1-1 emergency call is received by CCC911, 
the information gathered is immediately and simultaneously transmitted to all 
agencies that will be involved in the response, plus any adjacent agencies that 
may benefit from the information. The sharing of this information, and the rapid 
                                            
.110 “Spartanburg Communications / 9-1-1.” Spartanburg County, accessed November 30, 
2013, http://www.spartanburg911.org/. 
 69 
development of the technological systems to make it possible, was directly due to 
consolidation. The cross-jurisdictional information sharing capabilities are 
continuing to expand, with a system now in development to exchange data with 
military law enforcement at Joint Base Charleston.111 
Significant Benefit 
Deputy Director Burrell identified personnel issues as the most significant 
challenge for the CCC911 consolidation. From cultural differences between 
public safety disciplines to the difficulty hiring and retaining a qualified workforce, 
the issues surrounding personnel are by far the biggest challenge to completing 
the full consolidation effort. She believes the difficulties with personnel matters 
will eventually be corrected with the passage of time, as employees adapt to 
change and settle into the new consolidated model, and a common 
organizational identity develops specific to CCC911. She knows this to be true 
based upon the amount of progress that has been made in just the past four 
years. Deputy Director Burrell reflected, “It’s been very challenging, but the 
progress that we have made since 2009 is amazing—it’s absolutely amazing. I 
can’t imagine not having consolidated now.” 
  
                                            
111 “Joint Base Charleston–Units,” United States Air Force, Joint Base Charleston, accessed 
November 30, 2013, http://www.charleston.af.mil/units/index.asp. 
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IV. CASE STUDY—PORTLAND BUREAU OF EMERGENCY 
COMMUNICATIONS 
We have excellent radio interoperability with the three adjoining 
counties—Clark County (WA) to our north, Washington County 
(OR) to our west, and Clackamas County (OR) to our south. 
—Lisa Turley, BOEC director, 
speaking to the region’s public safety radio interoperability 
bolstered by the consolidated PSAP model 
A. BACKGROUND 
The City of Portland’s Bureau of Emergency Communications (BOEC), 
owns and operates a countywide consolidated Public Safety Answering Point 
(PSAP), commonly referred to as a 9-1-1 Center. BOEC personnel, numbering 
141 in total, are employees of the City of Portland. BOEC has an annual budget 
of $23.2 million, which is just 0.7% of the overall city budget.112  BOEC is jointly 
funded by the City of Portland, its regional partner agencies, and state of Oregon 
9-1-1 tax revenues. It provides 9-1-1 emergency dispatch services for the City of 
Portland and ten other agencies within Multnomah County, Oregon. 
BOEC has a long, well-established history of providing consolidated public 
safety emergency communications services. From 1974 until 1994, Portland’s 
emergency communications center was housed in a 1950s-era fortified 
underground facility, built to survive an atomic blast and maintain self-sustained 
operations for up to three months.113  As part of the Portland Police Bureau, the 
early communications center handled only law enforcement (Law) emergency 
calls for several local police agencies. Emergency Medical System (EMS) calls 
were added in 1980. With the introduction of the nation’s new 9-1-1 emergency 
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113 “BOEC History,” Portland Online, accessed September 2, 2013. 
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call system in 1981, all BOEC operators were cross-trained to handle both Law 
and EMS 9-1-1 emergency calls. 
In 1994, BOEC moved into a new facility in southeast Portland where it 
remains today. At the same time, BOEC began providing 9-1-1 emergency 
dispatch services for fire service agencies within Multnomah County, 
substantially completing the consolidation of all regional 9-1-1 centers. The 
current facility also houses the region’s shared public safety radio system, 
administered by Portland’s Bureau of Technology Services, and Portland’s 
Emergency Operations Center. Through an intergovernmental agreement 
established in 1995, BOEC continues to provide 9-1-1 dispatch services for all 
public safety agencies within Multnomah County, except for the Port of Portland. 
Table 9 presents each of the 10 agencies for which CCC911 provides services. 
Table 9.   BOEC’s Participating Agencies114 
BOEC—Agencies Served 
Law Agencies (5) Fire/Rescue Agencies (4) EMS Agencies (1) 




Gresham Police Gresham Fire & Emergency Services 
Multnomah County 
Sheriff* 
Multnomah County Rural Fire District 14 
(Corbett Volunteer Fire)  
Troutdale Police Multnomah County Rural Fire District 30 (Sauvie Island Volunteer Fire)  
Fairview Police 
*Cities of Wood Village and Maywood Park contract for public safety services through Multnomah County 
 
BOEC is the largest PSAP in the State of Oregon. In fact, BOEC operates 
three of the five largest 9-1-1 centers in the state; the largest being their main 
floor (35 workstations), the fourth largest being their back-up center (a mobile 
trailer with 15 workstations), and the fifth largest being their fully functional 
training room (10 workstations). 
                                            
114Lisa Turley, “BOEC Intergovernmental Agreement,” email message to author. 
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BOEC comprises 141 employees; with 120 in operational roles and 21 in 
support roles.115  Operational positions include 107 Emergency Communications 
(EC) Operators and 11 EC Supervisors. BOEC support staff includes 
 One business operations manager and budget staff 
 Two researchers who primarily prepare and provide 9-1-1 
recordings as requested from various sources 
 One client services liaison who manages customer relations with all 
partner agencies 
 One emergency manger 
 Several information technology (IT) employees, primarily dedicated 
to supporting the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system 
 One employee dedicated to legislative outreach and special 
projects 
 One outreach coordinator 
 Two support specialists who clean the work area and equipment, 
assist with scheduling, and perform other administrative tasks 
One EC Supervisor is assigned to training and leads the in-house EC 
Operator Academy; this training supervisor position is rotated to a different 
supervisor every two years. BOEC has a training room that can accommodate 
nine trainees, so groups of 9–10 EC Operators are hired at a time and run 
through the academy as a cohort. This group training model has been the 
practice since at least 1985. After academy training, new EC Operators receive 
on-the-job training/certification in three different functional roles: first at 9-1-1 call-
taking, then police dispatching, followed by fire dispatching. 
There are 10 EC Supervisors assigned as “floor supervisors” who provide 
direct supervision of the main dispatch area. These supervisors are spread 
across shifts, ensuring that two supervisors are on duty at all times, 24 hours per 
day, seven days per week. Operational management is provided by an EC 
Operations Manager and two EC Assistant Operations Managers. Director Turley 
                                            
115 Lisa Turley (director of Portland Bureau of Emergency Communications), personal 
interview with the author, November 1, 2013. 
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explained that she performs executive leadership functions and allows the mid-
managers to fully run BOEC operations. 
Director Turley advised that BOEC staffing levels had declined since the 
late 1990s, but then seemed to level off. More recently, staffing levels have 
fluctuated due to budget uncertainties; having had  six positions added two years 
ago followed by four positions being cut last year. In all, however, BOEC has 
maintained a relatively stable number of positions. The BOEC Organizational 
Chart, presented as Figure 4, provides a snapshot of the 9-1-1 center’s 




Figure 4.  BOEC Organizational Chart116 
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To staff the 24-hour, year-round operation, BOEC Emergency 
Communications Operators are divided between a “4/10” shift schedule, meaning 
they work four 10-hour shifts per week, and a 12-hour shift schedule. The 12-
hour shift variation was added in an effort to improve employee retention, as it 
was determined that one of the reasons behind tenured employees leaving for 
employment elsewhere was a desire for weekends off—something not provided 
by the 4/10 shift schedule. The 12-hour shift schedule provides employees with 
every other weekend off. EC Operators bid for their shift schedules every 6 
months, based upon seniority. Table 10 shows the daily BOEC personnel 
deployment structure. 
Table 10.   2013 BOEC Personnel Deployment117 





Takers* Dispatchers Supervisors 
0500-0700 7 10 2 
0700-0900 9 10 2 
0900- 1100 10 10 2 
1100-1300 9 10 2 
1300-1500 10 10 2 
1500-1700 12 10 2 
1700-1900 11 10 2 
1900-2100 11 10 2 
2100-2300 13 10 2 
2300-0100 13 10 2 
0100-0300 12 10 2 
0300-0500 8 10 2 
*Numbers are averages from a two-week period in November 2013 
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B. BUDGET / EFFICIENCY 
A primary question asked of BOEC Director Lisa Turley was whether 9-1-1 
center consolidation within Multnomah County resulted in cost savings and 
improved efficiency. Being that BOEC has essentially operated in some form of 
consolidated model dating back to the 1970s, Director Turley could not 
definitively say the BOEC consolidated 9-1-1 center has reduced costs; there are 
no “pre-consolidation” costs available to compare against current costs. 
However, based upon her years of experience, Director Turley’s qualitative 
opinion is that the sharing of 9-1-1 center costs between agencies is a more cost 
effective model. 
One qualitative indicator of possible cost efficiency is the continued, long 
term participation of user agencies. The same eight user agencies (outside of 
Portland’s own police and fire agencies) have “outsourced” their 9-1-1 dispatch 
service to BOEC for 20 or more years, each paying their share according to a 
population-based cost formula. Over the years, some member jurisdictions have 
expressed concern over the “high cost” of BOEC services, but none have broken 
from the intergovernmental agreement and established their 9-1-1 center. One 
argument is that this, in and of itself, indicates agencies have judged the cost to 
establish and maintain an independent PSAP as prohibitive when compared to 
the cost of continued participation in the BOEC intergovernmental agreement. 
However, there are other possible reasons for the continued participation. For 
example, bureaucratic inertia and comfort levels with “how things have always 
been done” could lead to continued participation. 
In addition, an important secondary contributing factor in the State of 
Oregon is that the state will only provide 9-1-1 tax revenues to one PSAP per 
county. If an agency within Multnomah County other than Portland were to open 
a separate 9-1-1 center, it would have to do so without the support of state 9-1-1 
funding. This is an important financial incentive, especially in these times of 
resource scarcity within local government, possible preventing a serious re-
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examination of continued participation in the BOEC intergovernmental 
agreement.  
Regarding efficiency, Director Turley provided her personal, qualitative 
assessment that the BOEC consolidated PSAP has “certainly improved 
operational efficiency.”118  Her opinion is that having a single regional 9-1-1 
Center, where all call takers and dispatchers are managed within a single set of 
organizational policies and procedures, and trained to the same high standards, 
results in standardized service delivery across all jurisdictions. All citizens within 
Multnomah County receive the same 9-1-1 service level and all first responders 
are dispatched according to the same guidelines. Director Turley explained this 
standardization results in the most efficient processing of 9-1-1 emergency 
communications possible, across all jurisdictions; from answering the 9-1-1 
phone call, to entering and transmitting data through the single CAD system, 
through dispatching and managing the public safety response over the common 
radio system. 
One cost measure of 9-1-1 dispatch services is the “per-call” cost, or the 
average amount it costs the 9-1-1 center to handle each emergency call. The 
per-call cost is determined by dividing the overall budget figure by the total 
number of emergency calls processed by that center. While this simple metric 
can be valuable to the individual organization, in that it provides a “snap shot” of 
costs that can be used to track efficiency from year to year, it can become 
problematic if used to compare costs between different 9-1-1 centers as each 
organization’s budget includes many variables. For example, one 9-1-1 center 
may employ personnel in-house to provide IT services and cleaning services, 
while another may have the benefit of receiving those services from an 
associated county or city department. Thus, the cost for IT and cleaning services 
may be included in one organization’s “overall budget,” but not in another’s. 
Many such variances exist between 9-1-1 center budgets, making it nearly 
                                            
118 Turley, interview. 
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impossible to compare costs across organizations with a simple per-call formula. 
The depth of research necessary to conduct the complex analysis required for 
accurate agency-to-agency budget comparisons was not possible for this 
researcher, given the limited time frame and resources. Consequently, it is not 
possible to make a definitive assessment of cost efficiency within the scope of 
this study. 
BOEC’s total operating budget, including the debt service cost for the new 
multi-million dollar CAD system, is approximately $23.2 million. Dividing the 
budget figure by BOEC’s annual 750,000 emergency calls, results in an 
approximate per-call cost of $31. However, this cost figure is not used as a basis 
for the cost charged to the user agencies. Rather, BOEC charges each user 
agency a percentage of the overall budget equal to the percentage of population 
served within the agency’s jurisdiction.   
Director Turley indicated the purely population-based cost formula can be 
a challenge, in that the per capita rate of service consumption is not equal across 
all jurisdictions. For example, the city of Portland averages about 22,000 
emergency calls per month, whereas the small town of Fairview averages about 
195. This equates to a per-capita ratio of approximately .036 for Portland 
residents and .022 for Fairview residents. Portland residents are therefore 
heavier consumers of services, yet pay the same population-based rate as 
Fairview. In total, the formula results in the user agencies funding approximately 
20 percent of the overall BOEC budget.119  The population-based charging 
formula is presented in Table 11. 
  
                                            
119 “BOEC Budget Information” (Power Point presented at the Bureau of Emergency 
Communications Public Outreach Forum, Portland Police Bureau - East Precinct, January 11, 
2011), http://www.portlandonline.com/911/index.cfm?c=54010&a=333863. 
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Table 11.   User Agency Charging Formula120 
BOEC Population Based Charging Formula 
(Fiscal Year 2014/2015) 
User Agency/Jurisdiction 
Population Percent of Total 
Population 
City of Fairview 8,920 01.19 
City of Gresham 105,970 14.12 
Maywood Park 750 00.10 
City of Portland 590,419 78.64 
City of Troutdale 16,005 02.13 
Wood Village 3,890 00.52 
Multnomah County 
(Unincorporated Areas) 24,798 03.30 
TOTAL 750,752 100.00 
  
 
C. LEVEL OF SERVICE 
The general effect of 9-1-1 center amalgamation upon service levels to 
both internal and external customers was explored. Specifically, the BOEC 
Director was asked about the effects upon training, operational standards, 
response times, quality of communications with field units, coordination of 
resources, and satisfaction levels of user agencies. Director Turley indicated the 
BOEC consolidated model provides a higher quality level of service in each area 
examined. A review of available quantitative quality of service measures was 
also conducted.   
1. Customer Service 
BOEC has considered conducting surveys across all user agency 
jurisdictions to gauge both user and citizen satisfaction levels, and rate the 
quality of service being provided, however none have yet been done. However, 
the city of Portland conducts annual citywide surveys to track constituents’ 
                                            
120 Lisa Turley, “PSU Certified Population Information for Cost Formula,” email sent to author 
January 1, 2014. 
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satisfaction levels with its municipal services. One of the categories included in 
the Portland surveys is 9-1-1 services.   
The specific 9-1-1 services survey question asks, of those respondents 
who called 9-1-1 during the last 12 months, “How do you rate the services you 
received on the phone from the 9-1-1 call taker?”  Results for the 2013 survey 
show 81 percent of respondents to that question believe the 9-1-1 services 
provided by BOEC were either “good” or “very good.”121  The survey results for 
each of the previous 4 years showed similarly high levels of satisfaction, with 
each year’s ratings above 80 percent. The survey also included more general 
questions as to the “overall quality” of police, fire, and 9-1-1 services. The 
comparable 2013 ratings for each of those categories were 61 percent for police 
services, 85 percent for fire services, and 76 percent for 9-1-1 services.122  
Unlike the more specific 9-1-1 services question, these general rankings include 
data from respondents that did not actually utilize 9-1-1 services. The 
comparable rating level (good/very good) for overall city government was 50 
percent.123 
2. Coordination of Resources 
Director Turley highlighted the centralized coordination of information and 
resources as a direct benefit of the BOEC consolidated model. While the 
Portland Police Bureau rarely needs support from outside police agencies, due to 
its size and availability of resources, smaller police agencies often back one 
another up on emergency incidents. Director Turley explained the consolidation 
of emergency communications into a single shared 9-1-1 center provides better 
service to those smaller agencies and improves officer safety. When an 
emergency incident occurs in any part of the county, all EC Operators are 
immediately aware and able to coordinate the sharing of resources between the 
                                            
121 “City of Portland: 23rd Annual Community Survey Results,” accessed December 21, 




responding agencies. If each agency maintained a separate 9-1-1 center, this 
type of joint response would be less efficient and likely require operators to 
coordinate over the phone between jurisdictions. This concept applies to the 
timeliness of Fire and EMS response as well. Rather than a fire or medical 
emergency call coming into a primary law PSAP and then being transferred to a 
secondary fire PSAP, the consolidation allows for the complete processing of 
these emergency calls at the initial point of receipt. All types of emergency calls 
are answered and completely managed to fruition within the same location and 
by the same group of employees. 
Finally, Director Turley noted that the consolidated communications center 
allows for increased availability of 9-1-1 personnel resources in the event of a 
major emergency incident. If the smaller user agencies were to operate separate 
9-1-1 centers, staffing levels would be smaller to match the reduced operating 
budgets.  9-1-1 centers with only two to three operators on duty can be easily 
overwhelmed by large-scale incidents. BOEC’s staffing model allows for the 
immediate sharing of EC Operators assigned to the various user agencies’ 
dispatch channels. Additional personnel are on-hand and readily available to 
assist, unlike a smaller 9-1-1 center where additional personnel would only be 
available by calling them in from off-duty status. 
While having increased levels of staffing for emergencies is beneficial, 
Director Turley noted there are both pros and cons to having operators working 
the variety of positions created by servicing multiple user agencies. EC 
Operators can begin their 10-hour shift working at a dispatch station for one 
agency, then later move to a 9-1-1 call-taking position, and finish their shift at yet 
a third workstation for another user agency. The negative presented here is that 
such lack of continuity creates learning curve challenges for the operators; the 
time required for all operators to become familiar with any procedural changes 
made for one user agency is lengthened. However, this is becoming less of an 
issue as BOEC incorporates and regularly updates agency-specific reference 
guidelines into the new CAD system. Positively, however, the availability of fully 
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trained EC Operators, who can work in any capacity within the consolidated 9-1-
1 Center, increases surge capacity; these employees can be readily moved to 
the areas where they are needed most when demands rise.   
3. Training, Quality Control, and Standard Operating Procedures 
A recent report by the City of Portland Auditor’s Office was conducted for 
the purpose of determining 
whether the Bureau provides ongoing training and staff 
development to ensure that operators have the necessary dispatch 
skills; whether call-handling quality control processes are adequate 
to improve call-handling performance; and whether Standard 
Operating Procedures are aligned with BOEC’s partner agencies’ 
input and with BOEC operations and staff expectations.124 
The audit report seems fair and objective in its assessment; the auditor is 
an independent elected official, and both the BOEC director and its overseeing 
(elected) City Commissioner provided written responses that were included in the 
final report. Data examined during this audit revealed: 
 BOEC has developed an effective new operator training academy 
and certification program, including the adoption of a detailed 
training plan with a goal to certify up to 50 percent of new hires, a 
“skills checklist” for call taking and dispatch training, and specified 
training for the “coaches” who train new operators 
 During fiscal year (FY) 2102, 61 percent of calls were emergency 
calls, and the number of both emergency and non-emergency calls 
has been increasing for the past two years 
 The BOEC workload has been increasing since 2011 - the number 
of calls and radio dispatch actions per operator has increased from 
8,485 in FY 2011 to 10,631 in FY 2012, a 25% increase 
 Implementation of the new CAD system has required adjustments 
to procedures, which are still being incorporated 
 BOEC has detailed Standard Operating Procedures and user 
agencies provide input into their development 
                                            
124 “Emergency Communications: Training, Quality Control and Procedures Warrant 
Improvement, Office of the City Auditor—Portland, Oregon, accessed December 15, 2013, 
http://www.portlandonline.com/auditor/index.cfm?a=455675&c=60923. 
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 There exists some inconsistency between the operators’ 
understanding of their level of allowed discretion and judgment in 
the application of SOPs and management’s expectations—primarily 
due to communication issues 
The report recommended changes to the BOEC approach toward ongoing 
training, quality control, and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP).125  While 
increased on-going training was recommended, the challenge noted by Director 
Turley in her audit response involved a lack of financial resources to meet that 
need. Being that 9-1-1 operations must be maintained at all times, removing 
operators from the operations floor and placing them in training requires either 
(1) conducting training outside of their normal shift on an overtime basis or (2) 
the hiring of additional staff. Balancing minimum staffing requirements with on-
going training needs is a constant challenge. However, Director Turley indicated 
additional staffing allocations are expected that will assist in her efforts to 
increase on-going training for staff. 
As noted in the report, BOEC has established an effective new-hire 
training academy. This would not be possible without adequate in-house staffing 
to administer the academy program, something smaller individual PSAPs simply 
cannot provide. Director Turley indicated this is one benefit of a consolidated 
model. Without the pooling of resources through consolidation, smaller 9-1-1 
centers have little choice but to send their new hires to minimum training 
programs provided by other agencies, costing them money for training that is not 
necessarily tailored to their own specific policies, procedures, and technology 
systems. Director Turley has worked for other 9-1-1 centers and as a consultant 
for a firm that specializes in advising and supporting 9-1-1 center projects. Based 
upon her experience, she qualitatively assesses BOEC’s employee training 
program as “state-of-the-art.”  However, even before training begins, the hiring 
selection process itself is crucial to increasing the success rates of new 
employees.   
                                            
125 “Emergency Communications: Training, Quality Control and Procedures Warrant 
Improvement.” 
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BOEC has a thorough hiring process that helps identify the most capable 
and qualified candidates for hire. Applicants first submit a résumé and a typing 
certificate, then complete an interactive, industry-standard test called CritiCall. 
The test is designed to help identify the most capable public safety dispatch 
candidates by testing motor skills and visual memory.126  Successful candidates 
are then invited to an interview conducted by the training manager, an EC 
Supervisor, and at least one EC Operator. Each candidate then participates in a 
brief interview with an operations manager and Director Turley. This final 
interview is focused upon ensuring the candidate is the “right fit” for the 
organization and fully understands the level of commitment required for success 
should they be hired. Finally, candidates selected for hire must pass a drug 
screening and a state-mandated background investigation and psychological 
exam. 
Once hired, new EC Operators enter BOEC’s academy training program, 
which includes a state-mandated two-week stint at Oregon’s Department of 
Public Safety Standards and Training Academy for basic telecommunicator and 
Emergency Medical Dispatch (EMD) training. BOEC then provides eight to-10 
additional weeks of intensive training at their in-house academy. After academy 
training, the new EC Operators begin a lengthy on-the-job training/certification 
process, which progressively moves them through the three main functional 
roles. This process entails six to nine months of training as a call-taker, followed 
by 9 months of police dispatch training, and ending with four to six months of fire 
dispatch training. After successfully earning certifications at each stage of 
training, the operator is classified as a senior dispatcher—indicating the operator 
can work at any position within the 9-1-1 center. In all, the hiring, training, and 
certification process takes about two years to complete. 
As to quality control, the report noted that BOEC “tracks call handling 
effectiveness, efficiency and workload measures,” investigates individual 
                                            
126 “CritiCall 911 Public Safety Dispatcher Pre-Employment Testing,” Biddle Consulting 
Group. accessed December 27, 2013, http://criticall911.com/. 
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problems as they arise, and implements necessary changes to procedures in 
response.127  The recommendation here was for BOEC to develop a means for 
tracking issues on a longer term basis to identify trends and correct overall 
systemic problems. However, BOEC already compiles a weekly report of call 
handling complaints along with a summary of how each was addressed. As 
noted by Commissioner Novick in his audit report response, “The bureau 
analyzes all complaints to look for themes and assesses how best to address 
systemic issues.”128 
Relative to employee perceptions of management’s expectations of strict 
adherence to SOPs, the report recommended clarifying expectations for the use 
of SOPs by defining “when operators have discretion to adapt or depart from 
procedures,” and “implement[ing] clear communication channels within the 
organization.”129   
Director Turley explained BOEC is taking a progressive approach toward 
this recommendation, one founded upon the concept of turning the BOEC 
training and operational culture from a “rules based” organization toward a 
“values based” organization; one that encourages more employee input into SOP 
development and application, and focuses on outcomes more than process. 
BOEC is moving from having 175 detailed SOPs, any one of which an employee 
could be disciplined for violating, to somewhere in the range of just 20 SOPs. 
The SOPs would then exist to address only the most significant procedures that 
allow for little discretion in their application by employees. Procedures having 
less significance, in terms of legal restrictions and liability risk for example, would 
be addressed through a set of reference guidelines that allow for more 
adaptation at the line level. Evaluating performance will then naturally become 
                                            





more focused on successful outcomes than merely strict adherence to a large 
number of detailed written procedures. 
4. Managing Unique, Agency-Specific Service Needs 
When asked how unique service requests from user agencies are 
managed, Director Turley explained that a process exists to incorporate agency-
specific procedures into the SOPs. BOEC strives first for standardization and 
consistency of procedures across all jurisdictions, but some unique service 
needs are accepted and written into policy.    
Through the User Board policy advisory process, BOEC has been 
successful in standardizing the response protocols across all user agencies.130  
BOEC has developed discipline-specific Dispatch Committees, composed of line-
level first responders, call-takers/dispatchers, and at least one operations 
manager. These committees discuss and develop the policies that are ultimately 
brought before the User Board for approval. Additionally, BOEC has a client 
services liaison who is dedicated to working with all user agencies and 
coordinating the development of procedures. He is often able to bring the 
agencies to understand the value of having standardized procedures by 
emphasizing the consistency in service that will result. However, occasionally a 
particular procedure cannot be generalized and applied to all jurisdictions, so it is 
written into policy and addressed through employee training. 
To help EC Operators handle any variations in procedure between 
agencies, BOEC has implemented procedural guidelines into the CAD system. 
When the operator selects the type of incident, for example a sexual assault or 
burglary, the system automatically presents a set of guidelines to help the 
operator provide the appropriate response. If the Portland and Fairview police 
departments require differing responses to a certain call type, the system points 
out the unique differences to aid the operator. 
                                            
130 The User Board is discussed in more detail within the governance section of this thesis. 
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D. INTEROPERABILITY 
The effects of the BOEC amalgamation of 9-1-1 centers upon 
communications interoperability were discussed with Director Turley, including 
both voice radio communications and data sharing. 
Director Turley emphasized the shared technology systems developed in 
Multnomah County as a direct benefit of the BOEC consolidated model. All user 
agencies use the same Portland-owned public safety voice radio system, which 
is in the process of being replaced with a more modern system. Like BOEC itself, 
the cost of the radio system is supported by the various public safety subscriber 
agencies that pay for access. Portland’s radio system is a key component of a 
larger, regional effort toward interoperability being funded in part by a grant 
through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and founded upon the 
SAFECOM Interoperability Continuum.131  As a member of the Portland Dispatch 
Center Consortium, BOEC is one of seven countywide 9-1-1 centers within the 
DHS designated Portland Urban Area Security Initiative region that are working 
together to coordinate all emergency communications systems into a fully 
interoperable “system of systems.”132  Director Turley noted, “We have excellent 
radio interoperability with the three adjoining counties—Clark County (WA) to the 
north, Washington County (OR) to our west, and Clackamas County (OR) to our 
south.” 
Additionally, all police agencies within Multnomah County share the same 
Records Management System (RMS), which allows crime information to be 
readily shared between agencies. This shared RMS is also in the process of 
being replaced with a more modern system. The recently-selected replacement 
RMS is produced by the same vendor who developed BOEC’s new CAD system, 
making both systems completely compatible. Alignment of these systems will 
                                            
131 “DHS | SAFECOM,” United States Department of Homeland Security, Office of 
Emergency Communication, accessed December 25, 2013, http://www.safecomprogram.gov/. 
132 “Portland Dispatch Center Consortium: Interoperable Communications Strategic Plan 
Update,” city of Portland,  accessed December 25, 2013, 
http://www.portlandoregon.gov/rdpo/article/457015. 
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allow for information sharing and data analysis that was previously not possible. 
Already, through BOEC, all user police agencies are dispatched using this 
recently-upgraded CAD system, which pushes information to and receives 
information from officers in the field over an in-car mobile computer system. 
Establishing such broad, common data sharing systems between multiple 
agencies is possible without a consolidated PSAP, however it is very unlikely 
these systems would have developed in this way outside of the long-standing 
consolidated model found in BOEC. BOEC provides a foundation for public 
safety resource sharing and interagency partnerships in Multnomah County. 
As with any 9-1-1 center, support for technology systems is crucial. These 
systems must remain continually operational, which requires IT support staff be 
well trained, knowledgeable of the highly specialized hardware and software, and 
available or on-call 24 hours per day. IT support for BOEC is provided by 
Portland’s Bureau of Technology Services (BTS), although five BTS IT 
employees are assigned solely to BOEC and are funded through the BOEC 
budget. These five IT employees provide support for CAD, Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS), and data research and reporting. In addition to the 
five on-site employees, BOEC pays for IT networking, firewall, and security 
support. Overall, IT systems and services comprise approximately 23% of 
BOEC’s $20 million budget.133 
While BOEC does not provide IT support for user agencies’ systems 
(outside of the 9-1-1 dispatch-related systems), BTS does operate and maintain 
nearly all of the in-car computer systems of the law enforcement agencies in the 
region. 
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E. GOVERNANCE 
The BOEC Intergovernmental Agreement (Appendix B) formalized the 
BOEC governance structure, which allows user agencies a level of “local control” 
over SOPs. The agreement established a User Board, consisting of one 
representative each for the following agencies: 
 Portland Police Bureau 
 Portland Bureau of Fire, Rescue and Emergency Services 
 Multnomah County Sheriff’s Office 
 Gresham Police Department 
 Gresham Fire Department 
 Multnomah County Emergency Medical Services 
 Troutdale Police Department 
 Fairview Police Department 
 City of Wood Village 
 City of Maywood Park 
 Corbett - Fire Protection District 14 
 Sauvie Island—Fire Protection District 30 
Members of the User Board are appointed by the chief administrator of 
each user agency. The User Board also has three citizen representative 
members, each chosen to represent a swath of geography within Multnomah 
County; the “intent being to provide cross-county representation.”134  The citizen 
representatives are selected jointly by all user agencies. 
The User Board acts as the BOEC policy advisory group, recommending 
implementation of procedures that affect user agencies through a simple majority 
vote. The board is also allowed to provide input regarding the hiring or discharge 
of the BOEC director, but the city of Portland retains ultimate authority for these 
decisions. The board’s authority includes:135 
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 Reviewing polices that affect user agencies 
 Making recommendations as to BOEC’s budget and user agency 
charging formula/process 
 Acting as liaisons between the participating user agencies 
 Participating in the planning, development, and implementation of 
all new technical operating systems that users help fund or that 
affect user’s operations 
The primary functioning governance body is the User Board. However, 
Director Turley advised there also exists a finance committee, which remains 
focused on budgetary review and recommendations, and an Advisory Committee 
that rarely convenes. The Advisory Committee is a high-level, executive review 
group, comprising only the commissioner in charge of BOEC and the mayors of 
all other user agency jurisdictions. This committee has not seen a need to 
convene often, since BOEC is viewed as being effectively governed through the 
User Board. 
Director Turley believes the BOEC governance structure is beneficial in 
that it allows the sworn executives of public safety agencies, or their 
representatives, to provide input and guidance as to BOEC budget and operating 
procedures, yet grants her the authority to completely run operations. Ultimately, 
she answers only to her commissioner and is shielded from all direct authority of 
any sworn police or fire chief. In many traditional, non-consolidated 9-1-1 
centers, the PSAP falls under the organizational umbrella of a police department, 
where a sworn police manager oversees all operations. Sworn public safety 
managers generally have little-to-no experience with 9-1-1 dispatch operations or 
the complex technical systems involved. Additionally, due to the nature of sworn 
public safety organizational structure, these sworn managers remain in these 
roles for relatively short periods of time, several years at the most. The learning 
curve involved with assuming such a role is a challenge–long-term 9-1-1 center 
civilian staff must once again train the “new” sworn director. A consolidated 
9-1-1 center model that produces a long-term executive director with years of 
professional 9-1-1 center experience, and grants her true executive oversight 
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authority, is preferred. This model provides better consistency and continuity in 
the organization’s leadership and vision. Removing 9-1-1 center operations from 
the purview of a first responder public safety agency moves the organization from 
being one that supports the entire public safety agency (through all manner of 
ancillary duties) to one that remains completely focused on providing quality, 
efficient 9-1-1 dispatch services. 
Director Turley provided a recent example of how her authority under the 
BOEC governance model allowed her to implement changes that benefitted 9-1-
1 center operations. Because BOEC originated as part of Portland’s Police 
Bureau, some long-held, police-focused procedures had simply carried over and 
were still being observed.  “Historically,” she said, “we have always provided 
some services that are better suited for police records personnel or other police 
department personnel.”136  One example was the acceptance of citizen 
complaints about police officers, how they handled an investigation or some level 
of force they employed, for example. Another example was providing information 
to citizens who called to inquire about the process for submitting or retrieving a 
police report online. To examine the practicality of these ancillary duties, and to 
determine if they should remain within BOEC, Director Turley initiated a 16-week 
project wherein many such duties were transferred away from BOEC 
responsibility and moved to the appropriate law enforcement agency. Freeing EC 
Operators from non-emergency communications duties allows them to remain 
focused on the 9-1-1 center’s core functions, improving the efficiency of BOEC 
personnel resources. Director Turley believes that if she were subject to the 
direct authority of a police chief, the transfer of these duties away from BOEC 
would not have occurred. 
 
                                            
136 Turley, interview. 
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F. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 
BOEC has a well-established organizational identity, one that has 
developed and solidified over decades of operation as a consolidated, multi-
disciplined 9-1-1 Center. When asked to explain, Director Turley stated, “The 
biggest benefit is that we are BOEC. We are not Portland Police Bureau or 
Portland Fire and Rescue—we are Portland Bureau of Emergency 
Communications.”137  This is not the case with 9-1-1 centers that are a subsidiary 
of a local public safety organization. Director Turley indicated that BOEC 
employees identify as belonging to a distinct and individual organization that is 
focused on one mission: providing the best possible 9-1-1 dispatch services. She 
explained that this is a significant difference from PSAPs that are administered 
under the umbrella of a parent public safety organization, in that those PSAP 
employees ultimately answer to the authority of a police or fire chief and often 
perform ancillary duties related to that parent organization.   
If Portland’s 9-1-1 center was under the authority of Portland Police 
Bureau, for example, its mission would be blended with that of the parent 
organization and it would have less autonomy as to overall management. One 
example provided by Director Turley involves how the BOEC independence and 
identity results in a more objective response from call-takers toward complaints 
of public safety service. When callers express frustration or concerns regarding 
the service of a partner public safety agency, BOEC personnel are able to 
discuss those concerns more objectively and without becoming defensive. 
Director Turley describes this as resulting in a more “helpful” conversation to the 
caller, since staff is better able to objectively listen and understand the concerns, 
then assist the caller with finding the appropriate resource. BOEC personnel do 
not find themselves trying to explain or justify the actions of first responders, as 
they do not hold a strong identification to that public safety agency. Rather, they 
are primarily concerned with the service that is being provided by BOEC. 
                                            
137 Lisa Turley, “BOEC Organizational Identity,” email message to the author,  January 27, 
2014. 
  94
Another contributor to the development of a strong BOEC organizational 
identity is the elevated budgetary and political power that has resulted from its 
more independent position within the Portland government structure. As a 
separate bureau answering to a single elected commissioner, BOEC is 
positioned as an “equal competitor” to all other bureaus, including police and fire. 
The BOEC commissioner therefore has substantial political influence toward 
citywide budget and priorities, elevating the 9-1-1 center within the broad citywide 
government structure. In this sense, BOEC employees have come to view 
themselves as part of an important organization with a true voice within city 
government, and not merely a subsidiary of a more powerful public safety 
organization. 
Additionally, as opposed to other organizational models, Portland’s public 
safety department personnel have no direct authority over BOEC policies or 
personnel matters. This forces the public safety managers to work through their 
chain of command to address concerns they may have with BOEC performance. 
The BOEC Director, sitting at the organizationally-equivalent level as the police 
or fire chief making the request, then has the authority to address those concerns 
within her own organizational context. This creates an atmosphere of 
independence and strengthens the identification of the organization for its 
members. The members know they answer only to the BOEC director and not a 
police of fire department commander.  
Unlike more recently formed consolidated centers, no organizational 
issues exist within BOEC related to “transitional stress;” even the most tenured 
BOEC employees have only known a consolidated work environment. So, while 
no data exists to evaluate the initial transitional process, this indicates the 
transitional challenges associated with consolidation can be overcome. Director 
Turley believes transitional challenges with organizational behavior have more to 
do with employees having to cope with significant change, rather than any factors 
directly associated with the consolidation of 9-1-1 dispatch services. Any 
established organization being merged with another will cause similar stress for 
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affected employees. Simply because this transitional stress presents challenges, 
does not mean the end result will be less beneficial once those challenges have 
been overcome. The organizational identity that exists within BOEC 
demonstrates that organizational behavior issues developing during the 
consolidation of 9-1-1 services can dissipate with time. 
G. POLITICS 
With BOEC being such a long-term, established consolidated 9-1-1 
center, Director Turley had no knowledge of any political support or resistance 
factors associated with its creation. There have been no political issues 
surrounding the nature of the consolidation during her tenure as director. Director 
Turley believes there is general support for the consolidation amongst all user 
agencies. Elected officials and other stakeholders have expressed no concern 
nor offered another model for providing 9-1-1 dispatch services. In Multnomah 
County, the consolidated PSAP model has simply become the accepted 
standard. 
The lead agency/jurisdiction for the 9-1-1 center consolidation within 
Multnomah County was the City of Portland. Director Turley is unaware of the 
primary motivations or drivers behind the initial consolidation effort, but believes it 
happened more as a natural progression of expansion rather than a concerted 
effort to change from a single PSAP into a consolidated PSAP. The City of 
Portland is the largest municipality within the county and developed the primary 
emergency call center when 9-1-1 was first introduced. Being that the state of 
Oregon only provides 9-1-1 tax revenue for one PSAP per county, Portland’s 
emergency communications center logically developed into a larger, countywide 
9-1-1 center that serves all smaller jurisdictions as well. 
H. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
When asked what other models of 9-1-1 center operations she was aware 
of, Director Turley explained she was previously employed by a municipal 
9-1-1 center in another state that was operated by the police department, a 
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common form of non-consolidated 9-1-1 center. This center was the city’s 
primary PSAP, meaning that all 9-1-1 calls—police, fire, and medical—were 
received at this location. Non-police calls were then manually transferred to the 
appropriate secondary PSAP, which was actually located within the same facility. 
This model could be described as a “co-location,” rather than a true consolidation 
of 9-1-1 centers. While perhaps achieving the benefits of cost savings through 
the use of a shared facility and systems, this model did nothing to improve the 
time delay associated with having two separate PSAP. A built-in delay existed for 
all fire and medical calls, due to the time required to answer the phone, ascertain 
the nature of the call, and transfer the caller to a secondary Fire or EMS PSAP.    
Director Turley also previously worked for a consulting firm examining the 
consolidation of police 9-1-1 dispatch services for a group of California 
municipalities. This consolidation never came to fruition, which she believes was 
because the involved agencies had conflicting expectations as to how a 
consolidated 9-1-1 center would address their own unique service needs and 
community expectations. For a consolidation effort to move forward, agencies 
must agree fairly early in the process on what level of service is to be expected. 
There must be some commonality amongst the agencies to foster collaboration 
and realize the benefits of consolidation. If one agency expects 9-1-1 dispatchers 
to provide ancillary duties in the interest of customer service, for example, while 
another agency is interested more in reducing costs by keeping the 9-1-1 center 
focused on its core functions, the conflicting interests will only become more 
problematic as the project progresses. For this reason, Director Turley explained, 
early discussions and consensus regarding the project vision and goals are 
critical to the success of a consolidation effort. 
To close the interview, Director Turley was asked to succinctly summarize 
what she believes is the most significant benefit and the most significant 




Director Turley assessed the standardization of services created by the 
consolidation of 9-1-1 dispatch services in Multnomah County to be the greatest 
benefit. Everyone who accesses 9-1-1 public safety services receives the same 
level of professional, quality service; whether that person is a resident of one of 
the various cities or unincorporated areas, a visitor, or a first responder. This is 
due to BOEC’s training standards and operational policies, which have been 
developed with input from all user agencies. Additionally, BOEC has written 
goals and expectations as to levels of customer service that all EC Operators 
strive to meet. Director Turley believes having this single set of high quality 
expectations applied to every customer improves the overall level of service 
provided throughout the entire county, something not possible when multiple, 
separate 9-1-1 centers exist. 
Significant Challenge 
Director Turley identified the most significant challenge to be ensuring all 
partner agencies remain actively engaged and recognize their input regarding 
BOEC operations is needed and valued. At times, she explained, individual user 
agency representatives may not be as actively involved in communication 
regarding changes to systems or procedures BOEC is preparing to implement, 
and then come away with the perception of having been disregarded when those 
changes take effect. To prevent this, constant communication with user agencies 
through the User Board is required, and information exchanges with less-active 
board members are particularly emphasized. Director Turley asserted that 
occasionally user agency heads do not take full advantage of the established 
governance structure to ensure their input is received and considered. Her desire 
is to provide the highest level of service possible to all customers, which requires 
active two-way communication toward consensus building with all user agencies. 
She and all BOEC employees truly care about the first responders and citizens 
they serve, regardless of jurisdictional boundaries.  
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V. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
We do things better than they used to, and we do things more 
efficiently. Better service, lower cost. 
―Dennis Kidd, 
SCR911 general manager 
 
A. ANALYSIS AND KEY FINDINGS 
From 2007–2009, the United States’ economy suffered its deepest 
recession since World War II, which was coined our nation’s Great Recession. 
The recovery since has been much slower and weaker than past experience 
would have us predict.138  Many state and local governments have experienced 
dramatic reductions in revenues and continue to struggle with meeting service 
demands with diminished resources. Public safety agencies have not been 
exempt from cuts, arguably jeopardizing their ability to effectively provide core 
services and weakening their contribution to the homeland security enterprise. 
Interest in cost savings and efficiency measures has therefore necessarily 
increased. The consolidation of governmental resources, and, specifically the 
regional consolidation of local 9-1-1 centers, provides one possible means to that 
end. This study attempts to answer the question, how successful has the 
consolidation of local public safety 9-1-1 communications centers been thus far? 
In search of that answer, case studies of three consolidated 9-1-1 centers 
were conducted: Santa Cruz (CA) Regional 9-1-1, Charleston County (SC) 
Consolidated Communications Center, and Portland’s (OR) Bureau of 
Emergency Communications. The primary data were collected through semi-
structured interviews of these amalgamated 9-1-1 centers’ top executives, each 
having over 25 years of experience in the field of 9-1-1 emergency 
                                            
138 Janet L. Yellen, “A Painfully Slow Recovery for America’s Workers: Causes, Implications, 
and the Federal Reserve’s Response” (presented at the Trans-Atlantic Agenda for Shared 
Prosperity Conference, Washington, DC, February 11, 2013), 2, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20130211a.htm. 
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communications. Secondary data related to each center were obtained from 
published reports, direct observation, 9-1-1 call load and dispatch incident 
statistics, staffing rosters, etc. The interviews were audio-recorded, fully 
transcribed, and closely reviewed. An iterative approach toward data analysis 
was then used to identify specific “first order concepts” within each data set (case 
study). This involved constructing a chronological summation of facts within each 
of the categories explored within the interview framework. These categories were 
General Facts, Budget and Efficiency, Service Level, Interoperability, 
Governance, Organizational Behavior, Politics, and Other Considerations. The 
identified first order concepts were then evaluated for underlying themes and 
patters across case studies, resulting in 15 general “second order themes.”  
Finally, second order themes were generalized further and synthesized into 
broad, “overarching dimensions.”  Figure 5 graphically represents the applied 
analytical process and its resulting first order concepts, second order themes, 
and overarching dimensions. The overarching dimensions have been used as a 
framework here to present and discuss key findings. 
Six key findings emerged that provide insight into this study’s two areas of 
inquiry: 9-1-1 center consolidation’s affect upon (1) cost efficiency and service 
quality, and (2) its organizational strengths and weaknesses. Taken together, 




Figure 5.  Applied Analytical Process 
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1. General Facts 
Each participant was asked to begin the interview by providing general 
facts, such as when their 9-1-1 center was established, the number of 
employees, shift staffing structure, and the number and types of agencies 
supported. Two of the 9-1-1 centers are well established, each having existed in 
a consolidated model for more than 20 years; one is newly formed, completing 
the last phase of its consolidation as this research was conducted. Current 
staffing ranges from a low of 55 to a high of 160 total employees, each 
comprising operational and administrative/support positions. The 9-1-1 centers 
provide 9-1-1 call-taking and dispatch services for groups of local public safety 
agencies, ranging in size from to 10 to 21 agencies. They serve a mixed urban 
and rural population ranging from 266,000 to 743,000 people. All centers operate 
year-round, 24 hours per day, and are staffed by personnel assigned to 10-hour 
and/or 12-hour shifts. All three centers are interdisciplinary in nature, providing 
services for all three public safety disciplines: law enforcement (law), fire service 
(fire), and emergency medical services (EMS). Two centers involved jurisdictions 
within a single county, while one covered two counties. 
2. Findings 
There was general agreement between all interview participants that the 
consolidation of 9-1-1 centers improves efficiency and reduces costs, at least in 
the long term. At times, supporting these claims with corroborative quantitative 
data proved challenging, due to a lack of historical data on “pre-consolidation” 
costs, the difficulty of applying a standardized metric applicable across agencies, 
and the time constraints of this research project. However, the primary interview 
data and secondary quantitative data is judged to be valid and reliable. The 
primary data, although qualitative and subject to some level of bias, was obtained 
from subject matter experts; leaders in the field of 9-1-1 emergency 
communications, each with many years of experience. The findings that have 
resulted herein are valuable as they provide first-hand insight into the 
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phenomena of 9-1-1 center consolidation. Each of the six key findings is 
discussed below. 
a. Interagency Collaboration and Resource Sharing May Be an 
Important Precursor to 9-1-1 Center Consolidation; and, the 
Phenomena of 9-1-1 Center Consolidation Itself May Spawn 
Additional Collaboration and Resource Sharing 
(1) Pre- and Post-Consolidation Collaborative Efforts. Two of the case 
studies revealed a shared, countywide public safety radio system had already 
been implemented prior to the 9-1-1 center consolidation. In one of those cases 
substantial law enforcement collaboration, with more than 25 partner agencies, 
had occurred in support of a shared records management system. All three case 
studies revealed that the 9-1-1 center consolidation spawned some level of 
additional interagency collaboration and cooperation. This involved the post-
consolidation development of a shared (in-car) mobile data computer (MDC) 
system (three case studies), the implementation of a shared law enforcement 
records management system (RMS) (three case studies), and enhanced 
cooperation toward common policy development (one case study).   
The enhanced cooperation on policy development is associated with 
Portland’s Bureau of Emergency Communications (BOEC), where the director 
advised member agencies have used the BOEC’s discipline-specific dispatch 
committees and user board, part of its governance structure, as a platform to 
discuss and develop standardized policies outside of those that specifically 
pertain to BOEC operations. For example, two of the fire agencies have 
standardized many of their response protocols for various types of emergency 
incidents. These policy discussions began as an effort to standardize BOEC 
dispatch procedures, but carried over to other areas beyond just the initial 
dispatching of field units. BOEC Director Turley summed up the idea best by 
saying, “They [two Fire agencies] are working together well and cooperating on 
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calls. I’m not sure which came first, the cooperation or the consolidation, but it is 
working for them.”139 
In the case of Charleston County Consolidated 9-1-1 (CCC911), the 
collaboration of jurisdictions developed through the 9-1-1 center consolidation led 
to the ability for the county to obtain grant funding through the Department of 
Homeland Security to stand up a regional in-vehicle MDC system. This system is 
somewhat unique in that it is inter-disciplinary—used by police, fire, and EMS in 
the county. The ability to implement such a data system across disciplines was 
due to the implementation of a regional computer aided dispatch (CAD) system, 
which was a direct result of the consolidation. Therefore, the consolidation was a 
key factor to both the funding and interoperability of this new system; it simply 
would not have happened but for the 9-1-1 center consolidation. Further, 
CCC911 is currently facilitating the acquisition of a shared RMS for its law 
enforcement member agencies, an ancillary system that serves functions outside 
of core 9-1-1 center functions. As Director Lake explained when discussing the 
technology improvements, “Other than the [pre-existing] regional radio system, 
everything else is a result of consolidation.”140 
All three case studies revealed evidence of inter-jurisdictional cooperation 
and resource sharing both before and after 9-1-1 center consolidation, so there 
may be some inferences to be made as to how these factors interrelate. 
However, it remains uncertain if a regional atmosphere of collaboration is a 
required precursor to 9-1-1 center consolidation, if 9-1-1 center consolidation 
itself actually increases the likelihood of further collaboration, or if it is perhaps 
some combination of the two. 
(2) Improved Communications Interoperability and Increased Regional 
Information Sharing. As indicated in Figure 5, all three case studies produced 
                                            
139 Turley, interview. 
140 Lake and Burrell, conference call. 
  105
data supportive of a direct benefit of consolidation to communications 
interoperability and interagency public safety information sharing.   
Although a common public safety radio system has not emerged in Santa 
Cruz County (CA), interoperability has been enhanced because of the Santa 
Cruz Regional 9-1-1 (SCR911) consolidation. For one, all agencies now use 
“plain language” during radio communications as opposed to the traditional 
agency-specific “9-code” or “10-code” styles of communications, which 
encourages jargon and replaces many commonly used words with numerical 
codes. SCR911 is also responsible for moving both fire and EMS onto a single 
radio channel, so full interoperability exists between those two disciplines. 
Additionally, radio dispatchers for the various jurisdictions are now co-located 
and in direct communication. As General Manager Dennis Kidd explained: 
There is zero delay in communications for incidents that cross over 
or involve multiple jurisdictions. The other agency’s dispatcher is 
not miles away from you, requiring a phone call to communicate 
and coordinate; she is 4-feet from you, already listening and seeing 
the information through CAD. Also, officer safety is improved 
because if an officer is injured Fire [medical services] is dispatched 
immediately without anyone even asking—no delay.141 
SCR911’s shared CAD system has increased interagency data sharing 
capabilities, which extends into the field through its ancillary MDC system. 
SCR911 has also resulted in increased data sharing between local police 
agencies through the implementation of a shared RMS. At the request of the 
police agencies, SCR911 facilitated the selection, purchase, and installation of 
the new RMS and now houses and maintains the system. The cost is separated 
from the SCR911 general budget and shared only between the RMS user 
agencies. This system allows for the immediate sharing of law enforcement 
information between these user agencies, which was not possible prior. 
The Portland region enjoys a high level of public safety radio 
interoperability and data sharing capability, although this could not be attributed 
                                            
141 Kidd, interview. 
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solely to the Portland BOEC consolidation. The region’s shared radio system was 
developed by a separate City of Portland bureau, independent of the BOEC 
consolidation effort. An existing regional, shared law enforcement RMS is 
currently being upgraded and expanded by this same bureau. BOEC itself has 
acquired and installed a powerful, modern CAD system that provides data 
interoperability for its user agencies. This is the one shared system that can be 
directly attributed to the BOEC consolidation and provides enhanced data 
interoperability. 
The CCC911 consolidation is associated with several direct benefits to 
regional radio interoperability and interagency data sharing. Although a shared 
public safety radio system had been established prior to the CCC911 
consolidation, two agencies were not using the system and still operating on 
independent radio systems. Those two agencies went up on the shared radio 
system when they were consolidated into CCC911. As to data-sharing benefits, 
CCC911 is directly responsible for several improvements: 
 Regional, cross-disciplinary MDC system 
 Common CAD system 
 Shared Fire RMS 
 Currently developing a shared law RMS 
 Providing support for a data network that connects its member 
agencies to state and federal partner agencies 
Finally, through its Dispatch Board, CCC911 member agencies have 
standardized radio communications policies and users now use “plain language” 
over the radio that eliminates agency- and discipline-specific jargon. 
b. Consolidation Requires a Project Champion and Support from 
a Coalition of Top Administrators and/or Elected Officials 
The Portland BOEC case study revealed very little data as to the original 
consolidation efforts and process, as this center has existed in some 
consolidated form for nearly 40 years. However, the “younger” SCR911 and 
CCC911 case studies each revealed data relative to how the 9-1-1 center 
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consolidation efforts began and progressed to fruition. In each of these two 
cases, there were clear lead agencies and figures that “drove” the initial 
consolidation effort. Additionally, the consolidations were developed from the “top 
down.”  
The “project champions” of the SCR911 consolidation effort were top 
executives of two local government organizations: the Santa Cruz County chief 
administration officer (CAO) and the city of Santa Cruz city manager (CM). These 
two built a coalition of support between the four original member jurisdictions. It 
was this group of chief executive officers, not the public safety department 
heads, which drove the concept of 9-1-1 center consolidation to fruition. There 
was very little support from department heads. Perceived as a threat to his level 
of control, the county sheriff was strongly opposed to the effort; even 
campaigning against the project as it developed and leading subversive efforts to 
sabotage the new consolidated center’s success.142  The primary motivations for 
this consolidation effort were cost savings and operational efficiency. The effort 
gained additional support just after the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, as officials 
recognized a need to improve the overall coordination of emergency 
communications and response during catastrophic events. 
The CCC911 consolidation effort was led by a local police chief. He 
formed a coalition of support amongst all police chiefs in the region and gained 
the full support of his mayor. The mayor, in turn, garnered the support of all other 
mayors within the county and the elected members of the county council. Thus, 
there was very broad, high level support for 9-1-1 center consolidation across all 
jurisdictions. Unlike SCR911, the primary motivation for consolidation in 
Charleston County was improved quality of service. When asked if cost savings 
was a consideration, CCC911 Director James Lake stated, “If money was a 
                                            
142 Ibid. 
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consideration, it was the least of considerations. It was really about service 
improvement, interoperability, and information sharing.”143   
c. Cost Efficiency Realized through Economies of Scale 
Economies of scale are the overarching dimensions that emerged from 
this research and analysis. Economy of scale has been defined as simply “the 
cost advantage that arises with increased output of a product.”144  Further, 
economy of scale has been described as “a reduction in the cost of producing 
something (as a car or a unit of electricity) brought about especially by increased 
size of production facilities.”145  Larger organizations can often realize economy 
of scale in various forms, such as more efficient production, increased 
purchasing power, and access to lower cost financing. Within the context of 9-1-1 
centers, this concept relates to the potential cost advantages larger centers have 
over smaller centers, and speaks to one area of benefit possible through 
consolidation. 
Data across all three case studies support what previous literature 
suggests: the primary generalized motivations behind 9-1-1 center consolidation 
are (1) cost savings and/or (2) improved quality of service. With regard to 
monetary savings, the data substantiates that the SCR911 consolidation saved 
money. Namely, SCR911 is able to provide 9-1-1 dispatch services with fewer 
personnel than would be required without consolidation; an estimated 60% fewer, 
according to the director. Cost efficiency was also realized with regard to 
technology and personnel resources. SCR911 General Manager Dennis Kidd 
provided context for the benefits realized through economies of scale: 
In 1996, centers here were still using handwritten cards for 
dispatching. They simply could not afford a modern CAD system. 
                                            
143 Lake and Burrell, conference call. 
144 Investopedia, s.v. “economies of scale,”  accessed January 9, 2014, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/economiesofscale.asp. 
145 Merriam-Webster Online, s.v. “economy of scale,”  accessed January 9, 2014, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/economy%20of%20scale. 
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Through consolidation and the resulting economies of scale, we got 
a state-of-the-art CAD that does not cost each agency that much 
because they are sharing the cost. Also, the economy of scale in 
human resources is a benefit. For example, I now have six or seven 
people on duty. If there is a significant event in any one jurisdiction, 
I have all of those personnel to draw upon for support. If I am in a 
small center with only two or three people on duty, where I am 
going to get the extra people I need to handle that incident?  That is 
the beauty of consolidation—everyone is in the same room and can 
help one another out as needed.146 
Additionally, SCR911 recently expanded to take over 9-1-1 dispatch 
services for jurisdictions within neighboring San Benito County. This recent 
consolidation effort provided current and accurate data as to the cost of 9-1-1 
dispatch services before and after consolidation. Data revealed the “outsourcing” 
of 9-1-1 dispatch services to SCR911 directly resulted in a 64% reduction in 
costs for San Benito County. This is one valid, quantitative measure that 
demonstrates consolidation directly resulted in cost savings for these agencies. 
This supports the qualitative assessments made by all interview participants that 
a single, larger 9-1-1 center can provide services in a more cost efficient manner 
than a group of individual 9-1-1 centers within the same region. 
The motivation behind the creation of CCC911 had little to do with cost 
reduction; the primary motivating factor for consolidation was improving the 
quality of service across all jurisdictions within the county. Charleston County 
assumed all costs of operating the new consolidated Center. In this sense, the 
county incurred increased costs while the smaller participating agencies 
eliminated all costs for 9-1-1 dispatch services. However, when considering all 
jurisdictional budgets as a whole, the consolidation was cost-neutral. Quantitative 
data contained within an objective pre-consolidation feasibility study identified the 
actual costs borne by each agency to operate its independent 9-1-1 Center. 
Subsequently, to fund the transition process, each member agency contributed 
its identified 9-1-1 dispatch service budget (and all existing personnel) to the 
                                            
146 Kidd, interview. 
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county in the first year, followed by half that amount in year two. For year three 
and beyond, these agencies paid nothing and the county assumed all operating 
costs. Through this upfront “pooling” of financial resources, the county was able 
to fund the design and construction of a brand new facility, acquire and install a 
powerful new CAD system, and stand up the consolidated center. So, while the 
consolidation effort was “cost-neutral,” the outcome was significantly greater than 
would be possible by any one agency acting alone; which is, again, an example 
of an economy of scale cost benefit realized directly because of consolidation. 
Director James summarized his view of these results by saying, “We have come 
a long way in a short amount of time - improving quality while keeping the same 
price tag.”147 
All three consolidated 9-1-1 centers have modern technology systems. 
The combined financial resources available through consolidation allowed each 
center to acquire high-cost, powerful computer aided dispatch (CAD) systems 
and some level of a regional, standardized mobile (in-car) computer system; 
thus, improving the quality of 9-1-1 dispatch services and data interoperability 
across all participating agencies. Without the sharing of costs through 
consolidation, the participating agencies would each either bear the full cost 
alone, likely installing disparate systems of varying quality, or simply be unable to 
acquire a modern system. Even in the case of Portland’s BOEC, where the city of 
Portland would likely have the financial means to upgrade its CAD system 
independent of a consolidated dispatch model, the city still benefits from the 
sharing of cost for this common technology need. The smaller member agencies 
likely could not afford this technology on their own. Each benefitted by gaining 
access to the technology through the cost sharing model with relatively small 
increases to their rates for service. The region as a whole likely benefitted by the 
enhanced data sharing capabilities availed through a single, shared system. 
                                            
147 Lake and Burrell, conference call. 
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Two case studies revealed a more direct benefit from consolidation in the 
form of improved technology; the consolidations resulted in the immediate 
acquisition and implementation of modern, advanced 9-1-1 dispatch technology 
that was not present prior to consolidation. To emphasize this point, the SCR911 
director stated, “Geographically, we were just 17 miles from the Silicon Valley; 
technologically, we were 1,000 years behind the Silicon Valley.”  He was 
referring to the lack of modern technology in 9-1-1 centers within Santa Cruz 
County before consolidation. None had a CAD system and personnel were still 
using hand-written cards to manage call processing and dispatch functions. 
Independently, the agencies within the county simply did not have the financial 
means to purchase a CAD system. Through the increased purchasing power that 
resulted from consolidation, both SCR911 and CCC911 acquired new, multi-
million dollar systems. 
d. Consolidation Leads to More Focused, Institutionalized Quality 
Control and Service Improvement Efforts 
Data between case studies revealed a more focused and institutionalized 
level of quality control and standards-based improvement efforts emerged after 
the consolidation of 9-1-1 centers. The concepts supporting this generalization 
included reduced response times, improved training programs, dedicated quality 
assurance programs, and accreditations. 
In all studies, interview participants noted the time required to process 9-1-
1 transactions—the time from answering calls to dispatching field units—had 
been reduced.   Each mentioned the primary reason for the improved processing 
efficiency was the centralization of all 9-1-1 call handling. Prior to consolidation, 
with separate 9-1-1 centers often divided by discipline, primary call centers were 
forced to answer, preliminarily screen, then transfer fire and EMS 9-1-1 calls to 
secondary centers. The consolidation of all 9-1-1 centers eliminated the delays 
caused by this transferring of calls; all calls, regardless of discipline, are now 
processed at the initial point of receipt. 
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The SCR911 director described this centralized processing as having 
reduced the time from answering the 9-1-1 call to dispatching the fire services 
response by 20–30 seconds. He explained that as soon as a fire dispatcher (now 
in the same room with the call-taker) becomes aware of a call-for-service being 
answered, she will broadcast information over the radio and “tone” the 
appropriate fire agency, even before the call-for-service information is routed to 
the dispatch workstation through the CAD system.148  This was simply not 
possible prior to consolidation.   
The change has been even more substantial for CCC911. This 
consolidated 9-1-1 center has specifically tracked improvement in call processing 
and response times. The response times for EMS have lowered from 10 minutes 
to 8 minutes since the CCC911 consolidation, a significant drop as EMS calls are 
time critical. Reductions in response times literally save lives by speeding the 
introduction of critical care during a medical emergency. 
All interview participants expressed the belief that internal training 
programs have improved as a result of consolidation. While the improvement of 
training programs may not have a direct correlation to consolidation, being that 
any 9-1-1 center seemingly could take similar steps to improve training quality, 
the cases examined here revealed training standards for the region were raised 
because of the consolidation. For example, the director of CCC911 explained 
that, prior to consolidation, there were two 9-1-1 centers in the county that were 
“really good at what they did; they had what they needed.”149  However, the rest 
were short-staffed and undertrained. The consolidation is what provided the 
necessary staffing and support to improve training throughout the county.   
All three case studies revealed organizations committed to monitoring and 
improving quality of service, with each having formalized quality assurance 
                                            
148 “Tone” here refers to the audible alert that notices fire station personnel as to an 
incoming emergency call. 
149 Lake and Burrell, conference call 
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programs. Two of these case studies demonstrated a correlation between 
consolidation and a resulting increase in dedication to quality assurance.   
Both SCR911 and CCC911 have developed stronger quality assurance 
programs since consolidation as compared to what existed pre-consolidation. 
The SCR911 Quality Assurance/Quality Improvement program involves one 
telecommunicator who, as a part of her regular job, examines the overall 
response and service levels provided. This includes developing metrics and 
standards, comparing individual incidents against those standards, and then 
discussing with the involved employee(s) how they performed. While the program 
involves only one lead employee, the SCR911 director advised no such quality 
assurance measures were in place within any of the pre-consolidation 9-1-1 
centers. 
CCC911 operates a quality assurance program with a dedicated staff 
consisting of one quality assurance supervisor and three quality assurance 
specialists. This unit is managed by a support services manager who also 
oversees the training unit, so quality assurance is organizationally integrated with 
training programs. The CCC911 deputy director, who was employed by the 
county’s 9-1-1 center long before consolidation, provided firsthand knowledge of 
how the current quality assurance program compares to pre-consolidation quality 
assurance efforts. She indicated the county had a limited quality assurance 
program, which was developed in-house and consisted of just one employee. 
The current program is much more robust and based upon International 
Academies of Emergency Dispatch (IAED) industry standards. Deputy Director 
Burrell emphasized, “We had one person who did quality assurance, but that was 
not their primary job. And, it was basically home-grown quality assurance. We 
didn’t have anything like what the academy [IAED] provides.”150 
Two of the 9-1-1 centers studied have attained, or will soon attain, public 
safety communications accreditation from the Commission on Accreditation for 
                                            
150 Ibid. 
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Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA). SCR911 garnered CALEA accreditation in 
2004 and again in 2010, and is currently the only CALEA accredited 9-1-1 center 
in California.151  CCC911 is in the process of attaining CALEA accreditation. 
CCC911 has already been accredited by IAED for its fire and EMS call-taking 
and dispatching operations.152  According to CCC911 Director James Lake: 
We are exceeding all national standards for call pick-up. Every time 
the phone rings, we pick it up within the minimum standard time 
frame. And, we are closing in on national dispatch standards. We 
are actually dispatching to get EMS out the door more quickly. All of 
those things weren’t achieved prior to consolidation. In fact, those 
were standards that in most cases couldn’t be achieved.153 
Such accreditations demonstrate agencies’ adherence to recognized 
industry standards for training, policies and procedures, and call processing and 
dispatching operations. Each of the interview participants from these 9-1-1 
centers attributed their ability to achieve accreditation directly to consolidation, 
facilitated by its resulting increased focus on improved training and quality of 
service, and supported by the increased level of financial and personnel 
resources. 
The common denominator for each of the benefits described above is an 
increased availability of financial resources which allows for the dedication of 
personnel and funds toward training, quality assurance initiatives, and 
accreditation requirements. Large, well-funded single-jurisdiction 9-1-1 centers 
might very well have the financial resources to finance these efforts, but this is 
more of a challenge for smaller jurisdictions with more limited budgets. For 
example, in the case of Portland’s BOEC member agencies, the largest is the 
city of Portland with an overall legal budget of $3.44 billion.154  The next largest 
member’s budget, at $384 million, is only approximately 11% that of 
                                            
151 “SCR911 Accreditation.” 
152 “Consolidated Dispatch Gains Accreditation,” accessed January 13, 2014, 
http://www.abcnews4.com/story/20648571/consolidated-dispatch-gains-accreditation. 
153 Lake and Burrell, conference call. 
154 “Adopted Budget, City of Portland, Oregon: Fiscal Year 2013–14..” 
  115
Portland’s.155  The two small fire district members’ budgets are much smaller yet. 
Budget disparity of this magnitude supports the interview participants’ belief that 
smaller member agencies are benefitting from a more robust training program 
through the consolidated model than would be otherwise possible, simply due to 
fiscal constraints. Without the consolidation, separate 9-1-1 centers would likely 
continue to provide disparate levels of training for their personnel, resulting in 
disparate levels of service provision across the region. 
e. Improved Resilience and Surge Capacity 
Surge capacity is commonly used to reference the ability for hospitals to 
meet the sudden increased demands of a mass casualty event.156  However, the 
concept is applicable to any system subject to sudden, extreme increased 
demands for service. All three case studies yielded data supportive of the benefit 
of consolidation to surge capacity. 
(1) Centralized and Increased On-duty Staffing Levels. In all case 
studies, consolidation resulted in a larger number of personnel being on duty at 
any given time within a single 9-1-1 center, as opposed to personnel being thinly 
spread between separate centers. All interview participants noted the benefit and 
flexibility this provided to large scale emergency incident management. If a large 
scale incident happened anywhere within the region, these consolidated centers 
have a greater capacity to manage the surge in demand because of the 
increased number of personnel on hand. While the smaller, single-jurisdiction 9-
1-1 center might be overwhelmed by the increased call volume and dispatching 
demands, the multi-jurisdictional center with a larger staff on hand is better 
poised to handle that surge. For example, prior to the SCR911 consolidation the 
City of Watsonville (CA) operated its own 9-1-1 Center, which was staffed at any 
                                            




156 Samantha K. Watson, James W. Rudge, and Richard Coker, “Health Systems’ ‘Surge 
Capacity’: State of the Art and Priorities for Future Research,” Milbank Quarterly 91, no. 1 (2013): 
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given time by just 2–3 telecommunicators. After consolidation, any large 
emergency incident occurring in Watsonville was supported by SCR911’s full 
complement of 8–10 telecommunicators. For all three case studies, a benefit of 
increased surge capacity was directly attributable to consolidation. 
The increased efficiency with regard to the sharing of common resources 
—facility, technology, personnel—and overall increased size of the consolidated 
organizations may have the added benefit of dampening the effect of budget 
fluctuations. Two case studies, SCR911 and Portland’s BOEC, revealed the 
recent downturn in the economy resulted in 9-1-1 center budget reductions. 
However, because the cost to operate the consolidated centers is spread 
between multiple jurisdictions, with varying tax bases, the impact was less 
significant than it might be to any single jurisdiction. Both centers have 
maintained relatively stable levels of personnel over both the long and short term. 
For the remaining case study, CCC911, the consolidated center has yet to 
experience any significant budget fluctuations as the center is still very new. 
(2) Personnel with a Broader, Interdisciplinary Skill Set. Data across all 
three case studies revealed consolidation was directly responsible for the 
development of a more highly trained workforce with a broader skill set. In each 
case, prior to consolidation there existed separate, discipline-specific groups of 
emergency communications personnel. In Santa Cruz County (CA) and 
Charleston County (SC) there were multiple 9-1-1 centers separated by 
discipline—police, fire, emergency medical services (EMS). Employees within 
each center were capable of handling 9-1-1 dispatch services for only one or two 
specific disciplines. Portland’s BOEC has always provided services for multiple 
jurisdictions, but started as a law enforcement communications center only. Fire 
and EMS dispatching was added later. Therefore, all three of these consolidated 
9-1-1 centers moved from organizations that provide more narrowly focused, 
discipline specific 9-1-1 dispatch services to a single organization that provides 
the full range of 9-1-1 dispatch services. This has resulted in the emergence of 
highly developed employee training programs to match the complexity of the 
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interdisciplinary nature of the position, something each center has successfully 
accomplished. 
Having all telecommunicators “cross-trained” and capable of handling any 
type of emergency call allows for more efficient personnel management and a 
more resilient organization. For example, Portland’s BOEC director discussed 
how dispatchers are able to seamlessly move between police, fire, and EMS 
radio dispatching stations; something they often do even within a single working 
shift. This allows supervisors more flexibility with how personnel are deployed, 
whether for managing break periods, unexpected leaves of absence, or the 
sudden increased service demands of one discipline. 
f. Organizational Behavior Issues Present Challenges to the 
Successful Consolidation of 9-1-1 Centers 
A common theme of challenges associated with transitional issues for 
employees emerged from the research. These issues were less pronounced in 
the case of Portland’s BOEC, again because of this organization’s long history as 
a consolidated, inter-disciplinary 9-1-1 center. However, all three case studies 
revealed that consolidation likely results in, at least in the near-term, additional 
challenges to employee training, hiring, retention, and morale. 
As the most recent consolidation, the CCC911 case study provided the 
most contemporary data as to organizational behavior challenges associated 
with consolidation. All employees from the separate 9-1-1 centers were offered 
employment with the consolidated center. In so doing, they would leave their 
current agency and become employees of Charleston County. The consolidation 
process was done in stages, with one agency added at a time. Coming from 
existing 9-1-1 centers, each with its own unique employee culture, organizational 
identity, and discipline-focused work environment, these groups of employees 
experienced considerable stress while transitioning into the new organization. 
Many more than anticipated simply refused to complete the transition, either 
resigning immediately or soon after. Some were negatively affected by changes 
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to pay and benefits. Only approximately 50% of the existing employees 
successfully transitioned into CCC911. Deputy Director Burrell put the 
organizational behavior challenges into context: 
I think originally, when we first consolidated, it was as if we were 
just two co-located PSAPs—EMS and the sheriff’s office. There 
might as well have been a wall built between the two. You would 
not think they were even located in the same building, because 
they did not work together whatsoever, even though many of the 
calls we received on the sheriff’s office side had to be transferred to 
EMS for medical services. It was difficult to get them on board, but 
the cooperation did eventually come. But, this has been the 
challenge with each consolidation of an agency.   
We have never received the full complement of employees. So, 
obviously that’s very disconcerting to us—that people do not want 
to transition. Although, once they get here they seem to enjoy the 
structure that we have in our center…as far as the work 
environment is concerned, they realize that this is much better than 
what they had with their previous agency. Just making the change 
itself is painful.157 
However, not all examples of employee transition are negative. An 
unanticipated benefit noted by the CCC911 Deputy Director was that, in her view, 
some existing 9-1-1 center employees have exceeded all expectations of the 
transition. Some who were initially opposed to the idea of transitioning into the 
new consolidated organization have since become its most ardent supporters 
and change agents. Several have moved into supervisory positions or other 
administrative roles and provided substantial support for the full completion of the 
consolidation effort.  
SCR911 began with a similar approach toward existing employees; all 
employees of the separate 9-1-1 centers were offered employment with the new 
organization. General Manager Dennis Kidd described organizational behavior 
issues that presented challenges during this early period of consolidation that 
were similar to those present during the CCC911 consolidation, including a 
                                            
157 Lake and Burrell, conference call. 
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higher than expected rate of employee attrition and difficulty with employee 
transition. He described the transitional issues resulting in the organizational 
culture being “really bad for the first few years.”158  As an example, some 
dispatchers continued to identify with their previous agencies—holding on to the 
organizational culture and ways of doing business they had known for many 
years. They sometimes resisted working at a different agency’s dispatch station 
in the new consolidated center, even though they were no longer employed by 
any of those individual public safety agencies. Some also were disgruntled over 
changes to pay and benefits. Over the years, these issues have faded and a new 
organizational identity emerged, facilitated by the development of a brand new 
hiring process and improved training program. However, the early period of 
transition was very challenging. 
B. LIMITATIONS 
This study was limited by the relatively small sample size; only three case 
studies were conducted. This presents challenges to the validity of applying 
generalizations made here to the larger population as a whole. For this reason, 
the findings, conclusions and recommendations of this thesis are best 
understood within the individual context of these three specific case studies. The 
environment within which any consolidated 9-1-1 center is created and operates 
undoubtedly present differing variables, making each set of circumstances 
unique. The intention here is that local government leaders considering 
consolidation might consider these findings and recommendations as they apply 
within their own emergent environment. 
The substantial reliance upon qualitative data provided by current 
directors of consolidated 9-1-1 centers is also a limitation of this study. Interview 
participants would each seem to have inherent bias by the desire to represent 
their own organizations as “successful,” emphasizing the positives and mitigating 
the negatives through their responses to the semi-structured interview questions. 
                                            
158 Kidd, interview. 
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Additionally, having invested their time and effort into making consolidation 
“successful” for their organization, each is at risk of some level of cognitive 
dissonance; making cognitive adjustments to justify their actions. When possible, 
assertions made during interviews were corroborated against quantitative data 
from separate sources. However, this proved challenging for several primary 
reasons: (1) the time limitations of this study did not allow for the in-depth 
analysis of budget data across multiple agencies; (2) budgets for 9-1-1 centers 
often include differing variables, making valid cross-comparison time consuming 
and complex; (3) a general lack of standard metrics applicable across 9-1-1 
centers; (4) lack of historical data related to pre-consolidation budgets for the 
long-established centers. 
Another weakness of this study was its broad scope. Because of the 
number of dimensions explored, each interview lasted between one hour and 
one hour, 45 minutes. Difficulty arose in fully examining each dimension with 
interview participants as the length of time for the interview became a factor. 
Each dimension proved more complex than anticipated and required lengthy 
discussion to achieve the desired level of detail in the data. Fewer dimensions, 
with a more narrowly-focused set of structured interview questions, would have 
allowed for more in-depth examination; perhaps increasing the validity of the data 
and subsequent analysis. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Based upon the results of this study, there are several recommendations 
for future research. First, additional case studies of consolidated 9-1-1 centers 
are needed to support or weaken these findings, potentially increasing the 
validity of generalizations as applied to the overall population. Second, future 
studies designed with a more narrow focus on any of the various evaluative 
dimensions employed here may result in a deeper understanding of the effect 
consolidation has upon each. Third, research is needed to accurately quantify 
costs pre- and post-consolidation. This research will require the availability of 
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accurate historical and contemporary budget data, sufficient time, and specific 
analytical expertise relative to public agency budgeting. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The analysis process employed during this study, depicted in Figure 5, 
produced 6 key findings: 
 Inter-jurisdictional Collaboration and Resource Sharing may be an 
Important Precursor to 9-1-1 center Consolidation; and, the 
Phenomena of 9-1-1 Center Consolidation itself may spawn 
additional Inter-jurisdictional Collaboration and Resource Sharing 
 Consolidation Requires a Project Champion and Support from a 
Coalition of top Administrators and/or Elected Officials 
 Cost Efficiency Realized through Economies of Scale 
 Consolidation Leads to More Focused, Institutionalized Quality 
Control and Service Improvement Efforts 
 Improved Resilience and Surge Capacity 
 Organizational Behavior Issues present Challenges to the 
Successful Consolidation of 9-1-1 centers 
From these findings, three major conclusions can be drawn: (1) the 
consolidation of 9-1-1 centers can result in increased cost efficiency through 
economies of scale; (2) regionally, 9-1-1 center consolidation may standardize 
and raise the quality of service provided across disciplines and jurisdictions; and 
(3) in the near-term, organizational behavior issues present significant challenges 
for the newly consolidated 9-1-1 center. 
This study revealed that 9-1-1 center consolidation allows for the sharing 
of common public safety emergency communications resources between multiple 
agencies. These resources include facilities, communications infrastructure, and, 
most importantly for cost efficiency, personnel. This pooling and sharing of 
resources creates opportunities for cost savings and improved operational 
efficiency through its resulting economies of scale, especially when the 
consolidation combines small- to mid-sized 9-1-1 centers.   
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At the most basic level, the increased purchasing power a group of 
agencies has over that of a single agency provides a direct benefit of 
consolidation; allowing consolidated 9-1-1 centers to acquire advanced 
technologies that any of the member jurisdictions might not be able to afford 
alone. For operations, the increased number of personnel available in a larger 9-
1-1 center has the dual effect of increasing surge capacity and allowing for the 
more efficient processing of regional workload. The primary factor for realizing 
these benefits is increased financial resources; infusing additional money into the 
system would seem to provide the same opportunity for economy of scale 
benefits to any 9-1-1 center, whether consolidated or not. However, given the 
limits of local public safety budgets for some jurisdictions, consolidation provides 
a means to attain economy of scale of benefits likely only available to the largest, 
well-funded independent 9-1-1 centers. 
This study also revealed that 9-1-1 center consolidation standardizes the 
service provided across member jurisdictions across all disciplines—law, fire, 
and EMS. This standardization generally raises the quality of service for some or 
all of the member agencies. Through its governance structure, the consolidated 
9-1-1 center is held accountable to all of its member agencies. In this way, the 
service provided becomes consistent and standardized throughout the region. 
Additionally, the increased size of the consolidated 9-1-1 center budget allows for 
improvements to training programs, development of quality assurance programs, 
and the ability to attain accreditations from recognized professional 
organizations. Regional standardization alone, of course, does not equate to 
improved quality of service. However, when consolidated centers take advantage 
of the service quality improvement opportunities availed through increased 
common resources, the standardize level of service built into the model becomes 
a standardized level of higher quality service. 
Finally, this study revealed the most challenging aspects of 9-1-1 center 
consolidation involve organizational behavior issues associated with personnel 
transition. Although examples of positive individual employee transitions were 
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revealed, established employees of separate 9-1-1 centers generally do not 
successfully transition into the new consolidated organization at the rates 
anticipated by project managers, with attrition rates as high as 50% for the most 
recent transition examined in this study. Possible reasons for this difficulty in 
transition include negative impacts to pay and benefits, loss of identity with the 
previous organization, higher skill set requirements of the new interdisciplinary 
position, and changes to working conditions and location. These challenges 
seem to be more pronounced during the early years of consolidation and may 
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